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Abstract
Even though maritime safety regulations provide an immense source of
knowledge for the whole shipping industry, it is recognized that these rules have been
developed reacting to serious disasters, and that their further improvements are still
indispensible. Thus, in the last decade, it became clear that maritime safety should be
addressed proactively rather than waiting for accidents to happen in order to elaborate
regulations that help avoiding the recurrence of the same events.
Accordingly, since the end of the 20 century, new subject matters such as
“Formal Safety Assessment”, “Goal Based Standards” and “Alternative Design and
Arrangements” continuously appear between the items of high importance in the
IMO’s agenda for the development of its rule-making and application framework.
The dissertation provides a review of state-of-the-art related to the “non
traditional” regulatory framework, and makes an explanatory an exploratory study of
the different concepts that materialize the proactive approach to maritime safety, it
also investigates the potential benefits and contribution of risk assessment techniques
to this approach. In addition, this work identifies some strengths and weaknesses of
both proactive and traditional safety approaches, and presents an outlook on the
ongoing work at IMO and the most recent results achieved to date.
Finally, the incentives for the development of a risk based ship inspection
regime and the basic foundations for this concept are examined as an expected future
step for the development of the current proactive maritime safety regime.
Keywords: Proactive maritime safety; Formal Safety Assessment; Goal-Based
Standards;

Alternative

Design

and

Arrangements;

Prescriptive

Standards;

Performance-Based Standards; Risk-Based Approach; Risk-Based Inspection.
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Chapter I: Introduction
I.1. General Context
The move toward proactive and risk-based approaches in safety regulation is
already well underway in most sensitive industries. At the same time, the utilization of
such scientific methods in the maritime sector is still in the first stages of development
and has little impact on policy formulation.
In fact, traditional maritime safety regulations have mainly grown in a reactive
way, with lessons drawn up from disasters and catastrophes constituting the primary
motivators for regulation improvement. These regulations still constitute an
indispensible base of technical knowledge; nevertheless, it becomes less effective
because of rapidly changing designs and increasingly innovative building techniques,
especially for “knowledge-intensive” and “safety-critical” ships.
Hence, in the last decade, the maritime sector initiated the modernization of its
regulatory framework, in order to overcome the limitations posed by the traditional
safety regime. Three main objectives for the development of the maritime safety
regime have been identified and will be investigated in this dissertation; they consist of:
•

Supporting the development of regulations - Formal Safety

Assessment (FSA): The FSA is a methodology, based on risk analysis and
cost benefit analysis, adopted by the IMO in order to improve the
development of maritime safety and environmental protection rules by
providing a support to the decision-making.
•

Promoting the innovation - Alternative design and arrangements for

fire protection: SOLAS regulation II-2/17 permits the approval of Nonprescriptive designs, if it is proved that their safety level is at least equivalent
to the safety level of prescriptive design.
•

Developing standards according to safety objectives - Goal-based

standards (GBS): a new approach which is regularly appearing on the top of
the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) meetings agenda since 2004, and
which has been, very recently, developed to be introduced in the next SOLAS
Convention amendments.
2
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These objectives constitute the backbone of the new approach to maritime
safety, adopted by IMO. Thus, the future development of these concepts would be
crucial for the enhancement of safety levels and for improving the picture of the
shipping industry, which suffered from unacceptable fatalities rates and catastrophic
environmental pollution in the last decades, mainly because of unforeseen failures.
The evolution toward a proactive regime is mainly characterized by two major
elements, namely greater flexibility, and more transparency in setting safety objectives.
In fact, instead of defining specific prescriptive rules, the new approaches state,
quantitatively or qualitatively, holistic safety objectives, goals and performance
criteria. Moreover, the concept of risk is usually introduced in an explicit or implicit
way, during the development and the implementation of the regulations. However, this
new tendency raises a certain number of issues, mainly related to uncertainties, reduced
confidence and the role of experts in the decision-making process.

I.2. Legal Background
There are various provisions in different IMO instruments and guidelines that
promote the development of proactive and risk based approaches, and emphasize the
use of objective and performance based alternatives in lieu of prescriptive regulations;
the following illustrate some of these provisions:
1. The FSA process was introduced in 1999 to support the IMO rule making
process. It mainly uses risk management and cost/benefits principles for
evaluating various safety alternatives. Subsequently, this process is being
progressively introduced at various other levels, such as evaluating safety
criteria or for the approval of alternative design and arrangements.
2. The ongoing developments of the GBS at IMO would result in a new
regulatory framework for shipping, especially after the expected
amendments to the SOLAS Convention, which would make the GBS
standards mandatory for new oil tankers and bulk carriers. These
amendments will reinforce the philosophy of risk-based approaches in the
design and approval of alternative arrangements.

3
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3. Various IMO instruments permit approving equivalents and alternatives
design in lieu of prescriptive requirements in many areas of ship design and
construction, which can pave the way for risk-based approaches. For
instance, the 2002 amended SOLAS regulation II-2/17 and MSC/Circ.1002
provide the methodology and guidelines for the approval of alternative
design and arrangements for fire safety arrangements.
4. Future developments of IMO instruments are focusing on the revision of
rules and methodologies, for promoting the introduction of innovative
alternative design and arrangements for machinery and electrical
installations and life saving appliances, which would emphasize the
importance of proactive and risk-based approach for setting the future
maritime safety criteria and objectives.
Thus, proactive and risk-based approaches are currently being introduced at
many levels within the IMO regulatory framework. Accordingly the development of
these concepts would constitute a major challenge for maritime safety for the future
decades.

I.3. Objectives and structure of the dissertation
The main objectives of this dissertation are as follows:
•

Identify the principle limitations of the traditional maritime safety

regime and determine the incentives for new approaches;
•

Investigate the safety approaches adopted in sensitive industries other

than the maritime sector;
•

Identify the characteristics of the proactive approach to maritime safety

and their relationship with risk management principles
•

Making a comparative analysis between performance based and

prescriptive regulation by the examination of their respective strengths and
weaknesses;
•

Investigate the various aspects of the new proactive maritime safety

regime (FSA process, alternative design and GBS methodologies);
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•

Provide a basis of knowledge, techniques and methodologies related to

the various concepts of the proactive approach to maritime safety;
•

Finally, presenting the incentive for the development of a risk-based

ship inspection regime and drawing the basic lines that would constitute such
system.
Accordingly, after this Introduction, the second chapter will discuss the
limitations of the traditional safety regime and the incentives for a new safety approach.
Then a comparative analysis between performance based and prescriptive regulations
and the safety regimes in sensitive industries, such as the nuclear and offshore sectors
will be examined in the third chapter.
The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the investigation of the role of risk
principles for developing a proactive safety regime. Then the principles of the FSA
process and its importance for the new maritime rule-making methodology will be
critically reviewed in the fifth chapter. Subsequently, the sixth chapter will cover the
proactive safety compliance concepts, such as GBS and alternative design and
arrangements.
Finally, the benefits and incentives for a risk-based ship inspection regime and
the basic lines for developing such system will be presented in the seventh chapter.
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Chapter Two
Aspects of the traditional maritime safety
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Chapter II: Aspects of the traditional maritime safety
II.1. Brief history of the sources of maritime regulation
The first recorded mentions of maritime law go back to the Babylonian Code of
Hammurabi, especially related to the bottomry and collision avoidance; safety was not
considered as a matter of public apprehension, and accidents were regarded to be
inevitable and act of the Gods (Mukherjee, 2002). Though, the first initiatives for the
regulation of maritime safety were operated within a private framework. Indeed, the
first classification societies were created in the 19th century under the impulse of the
maritime insurers in order to give them information on the quality of the ships and
their equipment.
In this context, classification societies imagined and conceived a system of
ships’ inspection which allowed them to deliver class notation attesting the degree of
confidence which can be granted to the ships. With the origin, these notations, rather
complex, covered the hull of the boats. This system of class notation mainly covered
the ship’s hull, the quality of the sails and was also interested in the competence of the
master and crews.
By the end of the 19th century, dialogue attempts took place between the main
maritime nations, such as Great Britain and France, particularly to establish common
rules for collision avoidance in the English Channel. Subsequently, the “s/s Titanic”
catastrophe in 1912 accelerated the process for the creation of international maritime
safety standards. This catastrophe promoted the first international conference on the
safety of human life at sea, which led to the first International Maritime Convention,
SOLAS 1914 entering into force in 1919.
However, the most important tuning in the maritime safety regulation history
was marked by the adoption in 1948 of the Convention creating the International
Maritime Organization IMO (originally called IMCO), through a United Nations
Conference held in Geneva. This Convention entered into force on March 17th, 1958,
and the new Organization was inaugurated on January, 6th 1959.
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The purposes of the Organization, as described in the Article 1(a) of the
Convention, are:
to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds
affecting shipping engaged in international trade, to encourage and facilitate
the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning
maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships (IMO, 2009).
However, tragic accidents such as the “Herald of free enterprise”,
Scandinavian Star and Estonia, together with environmental disasters “Torrey
Canyon”, “Amoco Cadiz” and “Exxon Valdez” increased the public awareness and
focus on maritime safety. Consequently, the IMO endeavors to find quick and
adequate solutions, which would both prevent, on a case by case basis, the same
accidents to happen again and that would cure its reputation and credibility, damaged
by the recurrence of accidents like those affecting bulk carriers in the nineties.
In fact, despite the great advances in maritime safety achieved since the
creation of the IMO, it is continuously target of varied and severe controversial
criticisms related to its standard-setting functions. For instance, it has been accused of:
•

Being an administrative body where political bureaucrats outnumber

technicians;
•

Producing too many complicated regulations, which are difficult to

implement, especially by developing countries; however, it is not given any
instrument to control the implementation of the regulations by these countries;
•

Failing to eradicate substandard ship’s, while it is not given any

possibility of action against Flag States that accept to register such vessels;
•

Acting in most cases after a disaster. In fact, most of the IMO instruments

have been generated after catastrophes, as illustrated in Table.1 (Boisson, 1999).
All these criticisms, amplified by the people’s increased safety and
environmental awareness, urged the IMO to find solutions that meet the new maritime
safety challenges, mainly by modernizing its traditional rule making approaches.
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Table 01: Contribution of Maritime disasters to the improvements of maritime safety

Disaster
TITANIC
1502 fatalities

TORREY CANYON

Place / Date
Cape race,
Newfoundland
April, 1912

Scilly Islands
March, 18th 1967

Spill of 119,000 tons
of crude oil
ARGO MERCHANT
Oil spill: 27,000 tons

AMOCO CADIZ
Oil spill: 228,000 tons
TANIO

Cape Cod,
Massachusetts
December,
14th
1976
Off Brittany
March, 16th 1978
English channel
March, 7th 1980

Oil spill: 11,000 tons
HERALD OF FREE
ENTEPRISE

Zeebrugge
March, 6th 1987

193 fatalities

SCANDINAVIAN
STAR

North sea
April, 7th 1990

158 fatalities
EXXON VALDEZ
Spill of 37,000 tons of
crude oil
ESTONIA
850 FATALITIES
ERIKA
Oil spill: 20,000 tons
Prestige
Oil spill: 63,000 tons

Alaska
March, 24th 1989

Baltic sea
September,
1994

28th

Bay of Biscay
December,
12th
1999
Cape Finisterre,
Galicia
Nov. , 13th 2002

Impact
SOLAS Conference of 1914
1st SOLAS convention
The North Atlantic Protocol on Safety Navigation;
Watertight bulkhead
Radiotelegraphy
Lifesaving appliances
1967: creation of the IMO Legal Committee
1969: CLC Convention
1969: International Convention related to the Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.
1971: Fund Convention
1973: MARPOL Convention
March 1977: announcement by the US of unilateral
measures on tankers safety
1978 SOLAS Convention Protocol
1978 MARPOL Convention Protocol: segregated ballast
tanks
May 1978: IMO Council initiative for the improvement
of tankers safety (duplication of steering gear control
systems)
Speeding up entry into force of SOLAS and MARPOL
Protocols:
May 1981SOLAS Protocol
October 1983: MARPOL Protocol
1982: Paris MoU on Ports State Control
August 1987: UK measures to improve Ro-Ro ferries
safety
November 1987: 1st IMO resolution on Safety
Management of shipping companies
April 1988: 1st package of SOLAS amendments on
monitoring systems
October 1988: 2nd package of SOLAS amendments on
damage stability
November 1991: IMO Res. A.680 on Safety Management
of shipping companies
November 1993: IMO Res. A.741 on ISM Code
May 1994: ISM Code becomes Mandatory after SOLAS
Conference
August 1990: US Oil Pollution Act
March 1992: MARPOL amendments:
- Reg 13F: Double hull for new oil tankers
- Reg 13G: ESP for existing oil tankers
November 1995: SOLAS Conference, adoption of new
regulation II-1/8-1 on damage stability for existing ferries
February 1996: Stockholm agreement on specific stability
requirements for ferries operating in North Europe
March & December 2000: EU ERIKA 1 and ERIKA 2
packages
Phase out of single hull tankers, creation of EMSA,
Reinforcement of PSC
May 2003: Adoption of FUND II
December 2008: EU ERIKA 3 Package, ship-owners and
Flag States obligation in the event of oil pollution

Chantelauve, G. (2006). Evaluation des risques et réglementation de la sécurité: cas du secteur
maritime – Tendances et Applications. Thèse de Doctorat : Institut National des Sciences
Appliquées de Lyon
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II.2. The actors of shipping industry
Catastrophes such the “Erika” accident, reveal the complexity of the modern
shipping industry in terms of interrelation between different actors that have an
influence on maritime safety. In fact, the “BEA mer” investigation report on this
accident states that the Maltese flagged vessel was owned by a Maltese shipping
company which belongs to two other Liberian companies, managed by an Italian
management company in Ravenna, manned by an Indian manning company in
Mumbai and chartered by a Bahamian company (BEA mer, 2000). The report gives
much deeper details, but this example is not unique in the modern maritime business,
which is completely different from the old traditional image of the sea trade, where the
owner of the vessel was himself the captain and the rest of the crew were his closest
partners.
Consequently, the application of international safety standards became
influenced by multiple actors (see Figure 1), the following Table 2 describes the role of
the main ones (Kristiansen, 2005):

Table 2: Influence of maritime safety Actors
Actors

Influence on ship safety

Ship builder

• Design of the vessel and set the technical standards

Shipowner

• Decide on the degree of application of international standards (Evasive,
compliance or safety);
• Decides on the crewing composition and standard;
• Decision making on all organizational and operational safety policies.

Cargo owner

• Pays for the transport operation, thus decide on the quality of the selected
ship for the service.

Flag State

• Overall control of the vessel, its crew and the application of
national/international standards.

Classification

• Control of technical standards during the ship construction and exploitation;

societies

• Undertake some or the majority of Flag States’ control responsibility.

Port State

• Responsible for safety in the Port and its approach;
• Control the safety levels of the ships and in extreme case may detain or
deny the access of a ship to its port.

10
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Figure 1: Principal actors of the maritime safety

II.3. Classification rules vs. statutory regulation
Because of its international character, the shipping industry is subject to a
multitude of rules and regulations, technical standards and codes of best practices,
either under mandatory or voluntary basis, and public or private origins. Mainly, two
types of maritime safety regulations can be distinguished, namely, statutory regulations
and classification rules.
¾ Statutory regulation
Historically, the purpose of the statutory regulations was, initially, the
safeguard of the human life at sea and then, following several ecological catastrophes,
the environmental protection. In the 21st century, the problem of terrorism and
maritime security also became a subject of concern.
Flag states are responsible for the enforcement of statutory regulations which
are mainly dictated by international conventions developed by the IMO. Accordingly,
States can choose to exert their control related to the statutory surveys directly, or to
delegate their functions (entirely or partially) to recognized organizations.
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¾ Classification rules
The classification rules generally cover the solidity of the ship’s structure,
construction materials, principal and auxiliary machinery, control systems, electric
installations, cargo installations, systems of fire detection and extinguishing and the
ship stability. They cover imperative standards that constitute conditions for the class
attribution, in addition to the less constraining provisions consisting in technical notes
which prepare for future requirements of classification. Classification rules are mainly
divided into new buildings and ships in service rules.
¾ Overlapping between statutory and classification rules
Historically, the classification rules were primarily concerned by the risk
evaluation for the ship and its cargo, much more than the safeguard of the human life
at sea, which was the purpose of the SOLAS Convention. It constituted the main
difference between the statutory and classification rules. However, these two fields are
closely dependent on each other, because the effectiveness of classification rules for
the ship construction will certainly contribute to the general safety framework.
Moreover, these two fields are now much more closely dependent as the IMO
imposes the recourse to classification rules, especially by SOLAS Chapter II-1
regulation 3-1, which states that “… ships shall be designed, constructed and
maintained in compliance with the structural, mechanical and electrical requirements
of a classification society”. The overlapping between the classification system and
some IMO Conventions is illustrated in figure 2:

Figure 2: Overlapping between some IMO conventions and classification rules

Chantelauve, G. (2006). Evaluation des risques et réglementation de la sécurité: cas du
secteur maritime – Tendances et Applications. Thèse de Doctorat : Institut National des
Sciences Appliquées de Lyon
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II.4. Problems of the traditional maritime regulation
Regulation is an indispensable factor of maritime safety. However, the
international maritime regulation is heavily criticized because of its complexity, its
volume, diversity and incompleteness.
¾ Volume of maritime regulation
The huge number of regulations makes them difficult for States to interpret and
implement. Mainly, there are two reasons for this heavy volume of regulations.
First, after having been in competition with other UN organizations such as
UNCTAD and ILO for the establishment of international maritime standards, today,
the IMO find itself confronting other regional organizations in order to impose
international standards. For instance, the US or the EU are not only adopting measures
to interpret and harmonize the implementation of existing conventions, but they also
elaborate their own mandatory directives on problems that are still not addressed on a
universal scale, or even to rise the IMO standards to a higher level.
Second, the quick pace of technical progress and the huge number of problems
calling for urgent solutions, made the IMO using the tacit acceptance regularly to keep
a close eye on the technical innovation and prevent the aging of its regulations.
However, this instrument does not have only benefits, but also drawbacks. For instance,
on certain occasions the quick pace of rules generating, created point saturation, and it
became impossible for States to implement the huge amount of standards adopted.
¾ Diversity of safety standards
International safety regulations are extremely numerous and diverse; this
diversity can be observed on three levels:
-

Firstly, public regulations comprise both technical and legal requirements.

These two aspects require different procedures for their preparation, amendment and
enforcement. For instance, an international convention may comprise both compulsory
rules and recommendations which will be implemented at different degrees by States.
13
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-

Secondly, technical standards have different legal forces, depending on

whether they are prescribed by conventions or resolutions. In the first case, the
principle of “pacta sunt servanda” applies; but in the case of resolutions, some
flexibility is left to the States’ legislators for the implementation process.
-

Finally, regulations may sometimes be technically precise but legally vague,

because the texts are often reviewed and adjusted to ensure the broadest possible
agreement. Consequently, certain rules are so vague that they leave the issue of
implementation open to all kinds of interpretation.
¾ Loopholes in safety rules
Several IMO instruments have wide ranges of application, depending, for
instance, on the type of navigation, registered tonnage and the age of the ship.
Accordingly, these aspects are now used in a commercial context, to increase the
shipowners’ incomes, at the expense of safety. For instance, container ships are
increasing the over-deck cargo to decrease their gross-tonnage and other ships take
profit of the “grand-father clauses” to implement lower safety standards. These
Loopholes are now put in question for their impact on safety.
In this context, Boisson (1999) states that:
The safety laws, so difficult to understand and interpret, so
complicated to implement and enforce, raise a new set of problems
for those concerned with safety. This situation is disturbing the
shipping industry. The harmful effects of over-regulation and the
fragmentation of rules have been denounced. Difficulties arise from
the fact that the international standards governing safety at sea are
heterogeneous, many in number and incomplete. Another sources of
anxiety is the increasing speed at which the law changes. Despite the
proliferation of regulatory organizations, certain loopholes persist in
the law. Overlapping and duplication of efforts to promote maritime
safety continue in the absence of global co-ordination.
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¾ Reactivity
Maritime regulations have long time been criticized because of the reactive
nature of its development, generally following catastrophes, also known as “regulation
by the disasters”. The principal limits of this approach is that taking decisions with
limited range of application after a crisis, resulted both in a complex regulation and an
over-regulation, which have a prescriptive aspect that typically dictates the minimal
technical or competence requirements. Consequently, a “compliance culture” has long
time regulated the maritime sector, associated with a reduced capacity of innovation
and initiative taking (Chantelauve, 2006).
¾ Deterministic Principle
Also, the traditional maritime rule-making is based upon a deterministic
approach that mainly addresses technical systems or human elements. However, the
solutions generated by this approach often remain incomplete, because of the oversimplification made during the analysis process giving excessive weight to the
technical and human factors (Boisson, 1996).
Boisson (1999) states that for over a hundred and fifty years, maritime safety
mainly relied on a deterministic philosophy, assuming that every event has a cause,
and that the same causes produce the same effects. Consequently, maritime safety
became a set of preventive measures based on malfunctions in the shipping industry,
namely maritime accidents and incidents. This attitude is now criticized for being
complex, permanently out of date, constantly failing to keep up with technological
innovations, thus, inadequate to meet the overall challenges of maritime safety for
providing a safe, efficient, environment friendly and highly competitive transportation
mode.
However, as response to such criticisms, Mr. Mitropoulos suggests that “the
IMO manages to navigate a successful course between the proverbial “rock and a hard
place” by working at whatever pace is appropriate for the issue in hand and the context
within which it is being considered” (Mitropoulos, 2004). Thus, a wind of change in
the safety regulations policy making was indispensible.
15
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II.5. Chapter Conclusions
This Chapter discussed traditional maritime regulation regime. It is important
to notice that in the maritime sector, the prescriptive regulations played and continue to
play an important role in the safety control. Thus, the objective is not to call into
question or to critisize the traditional maritime safety regulation framework, for several
reasons such as:
•

In spite of apparent criticisms and dysfunctions, this existing legislation

is a capital source of knowledge;
•

The development of such a regulation in the historical and international

context of maritime safety was a necessary stage of consolidation;
•

The progressive evolution of maritime safety regime should find

solutions to the current and foreseeable future problems.
By reviewing the traditional maritime safety regime, the author is rather trying
to identify possible dysfunctions that justify the needs for the recent evolutions.
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Chapter III: The New Safety approaches
III.1. general context
In the previous chapter the indispensability of regulation for the maritime
safety was exposed. Also, there was an attempt to present the problematic posed by
traditional safety approach and the panoply of criticisms that addressed this approach,
especially with regards to its reactive and prescriptive nature. Consequently, new
safety approaches have been considered to overcome these loopholes, using more
scientific tools such as risk science at the stages of rules making and application.
Ideally, the new approach would at least meet the following expectations:
•

Provide solutions that respond to well defined hazards;

•

Incorporate the management aspects, by placing the responsibility for
safety within the hands of the operators themselves;

•

Make benefit from recent technological, operational and managerial
advances;

•

Give incentives for operators that should consider that safety is assisting
them to achieve their corporate objectives (Kuo, 1999).

•

Provide a holistic safety approach that gives to regulation the flexibility to
adapt to the quick pace of technological innovation.

In this context, risk science has been introduced at two levels in the maritime
safety regulation. First, at the stage of rule making thought the concept of Formal
Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 1997), and second, at the stage of the rules
application, for instance, the introduction of the “alternative design” approach
(SOLAS regulation II-2/17), or the Goal-based ship construction standards.
These concepts will be thoroughly reviewed, but first two other “nonmaritime” alternatives to traditional safety approach have been selected in order to
introduce the new regulation tendencies. Firstly, the nuclear industry, as it is the first
sector using risk principles in its rule making (Lassagne, 2004), and secondly, the
offshore safety approach because of the similarities between this industry and the
maritime field. Then, a comparative review between prescriptive and performancebased regulations will be presented in this chapter.
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III.2. Nuclear sector: “Risk-informed” regulation approach
When he was asked about the need to risk-inform regulations that are “good
enough” for the safety and oversight of currently operating reactors, and even for the
evolutionary and advanced reactor designs, Mr. Nils Diaz, Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), replayed that: ““good enough” should not be our
standard … ...when we have the know-how and the tools to create regulations that will
allow us to incrementally incorporate the best scientific and technical information, and
the best methods and approaches” (Diaz, 2004, p.03).
The U.S. NRC was the origin for the developments of many risk analysis
techniques in the seventies. Today, it is mostly recognized as the creator of a doctrine
in the risk-based rules making, which is the risk-informed regulations. This approach is
defined to be a regulatory decision-making that “represents a philosophy whereby risk
insights are considered together with other factors to establish requirements that better
focus licensee and regulatory attention on design and operational issues commensurate
with their importance to public health and safety” (U.S.NRC, 2004, p.07). It can be
explained by the use of the probability and consequences of an undesirable event to
influence the regulations decision-making process. The framework for risk-informing a
specific regulation is explained in Figure 3.
This approach was initiated in 1995, when the NRC Policy Commission
declared that the use of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) should be increased in all
regulation-making processes, in order to supplement the deterministic approaches, and
reinforce the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy (U.S.NRC, 1995). In fact, even
though this approach was originally used only for few specific regulations, its
application has been generalized, especially after the nuclear catastrophe of three-mile
Island (U.S.NRC, 2009).
Although encouraging, and being at the origin, of the use of risk analysis
techniques, NRC has also insisted on their limits, especially with regard to the
uncertainties. They suggest that the guiding principle is “risk informed” and not “risk
based” rule making. Accordingly, the risk-informed and performance-based regulatory
structure should rather be used as holistic principles, to complement the NRC’s
deterministic approach and support the NRC’s traditional defense-in-depth philosophy
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(Lassagne, 2004), which confirms the importance of keeping the balance right between
the utilization of different techniques.

Figure 3: Framework for Risk-informing of a specific regulation

US Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (2000, April). Framework for risk-informing the
technical requirements of 10 CFR 50. Retrieved May 02, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2000/secy20000086/attachment1.pdf

Recently, the new principles of “realism” and “conservatism” were introduced
by the NRC. These principles consist of:
•

The regulations are informed by “the real world”, science, technology, the
experience (Realistic approach);

•

Safety margins are preserved in an effective and adequate manner
(conservatism principle);

•

A balanced approach must allow the protection of the public health and the
safety, in ensuring that the resources are allocated the prioritized safety subjects;

•

The regulation must correspond to the real risk and not to assumptions of
“worst case” scenarios (Diaz, 2003), to avoid over-regulation and wastage of
resources.
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III.3. Offshore industry: the “safety case” approach
The UK offshore regulation approach has been marked by a significant shift in
the last decades. In fact, following to Lord Cullen’s investigation into the “Piper
Alpha” disaster in 1988, it has been proved that the compliance with prescriptive safety
codes and standards was not sufficient to ensuring the safety of offshore systems
(Cullen, 1990). Consequently, the regulatory trend moved away from prescriptive
requirements towards performance-based systems, where the responsibility shifted to
the oil/gas exploration operators, who should develop and present well reasoned
arguments and evidence proving that the design and operation of their systems achieve
acceptable levels of safety, in all their life cycle stages. This approach is referred to as
the “safety case” (HSE, 2006).
Kuo (1999) states that the concept of the “safety case” has been developed and
derived from the application of “systems engineering principles”, whereby the safety
of systems and installations does not depend solely on previous operational experience,
but rather uses all available expertise and information in a logical way. Accordingly,
the principles of this approach were first adopted by the nuclear industry, and later by
the chemical and offshore sectors.
For instance, if a new installation concept is generated, the safety of the project
can be modeled by answering a number of fundamental questions such as the
following:
Table 3: Fundamentals of the safety case concept
Questions
What aspects can go
wrong?
What are the likelihoods
and impacts?
How can they be reduced?
What to do if an accident
occurs?
How can safety be
managed

Tasks
Identifying hazards systematically
Assessing the risk levels of the
hazards
Reducing risk levels of selected
hazards
Being prepared to respond to
emergency situations
Managing and controlling risk levels
of hazards

Scientific terms
Hazard Identification
Risk Assessment
Risk Reduction
Emergency
preparedness
Safety Management
System

Kuo, C. (1999). Managing ship safety. London: LLP publishing
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Accordingly, the use of risk management principles were generalized and
progressively increased throughout the offshore industry. Pillay and Wang (2003)
identified five key elements on which the “safety case” concept is based, as follows:
•

Hazard Identification
Identifying all likely hazards, which would potentially endanger the system or

cause a major accident.
•

Risk assessment
Evaluating the risk levels associated with each identified hazard, hazards are

generally grouped in three regions, namely intolerable, tolerable (As Low As
Reasonably Practicable ALARP region) and negligible as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 04: HSE framework for risk tolerability

Det Norske Veritas. (2002). Marine risk assessment. London: HSE Books.

•

Risk reduction
Reducing risks associated with intolerable levels and, lowering tolerable risk if

such operation can be done cost-effectively.
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•

Emergency preparedness
To be prepared in the event that a hazard becomes a reality, even when all

necessary precautions have been taken against it, and take the appropriate measures to
reduce its impacts.
•

Safety management system
The purpose of the SMS is ensuring that the organization is safely and

efficiently achieving its goals, without damage to the people, the installations and the
environment. The SMS has five components as follows:
-

Formulation of the Policy;

-

Organizing the resources and communication of information;

-

Implementation of the agreed policies and actions;

-

Measuring the achievement of the required standards;

-

Review of performance and making relevant refinement.

These five key elements on which the “safety case” concept is based, are
presented in Figure 5 (Kuo & Cojeen, 2000):

Figure 5: The Five key elements of the safety case concept

The nuclear and offshore safety concepts are considered to be pillows of the
modern safety approach, and have certainly influenced the new proactive maritime
approach adopted by the IMO, which will now be reviewed.
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III.4. From prescription to performance:
Being proactive means identifying at early stages the factors that may affect
the maritime safety and developing rules and regulations that would prevent the
occurrence of such undesirable events, as opposed to the “regulation by disaster” that
responds, on a ad-hoc basis, to a single accident (Psaraftis, 2002).
The paradigm shift toward a proactive maritime safety includes the transition
from prescriptive to performance-based codes. In fact, this tendency of moving
toward performance-based codes is, in part, due to the fast pace of technological
innovation and the negative aspect of prescriptive regulations to respond to these
scientific and engineering advances.
In contrast, performances–based codes basically set the safety objectives and
criteria, and leave to the designer the conception and selection of the most effective
alternatives of achieving these objectives, which allow a great degree of flexibility
and encourages innovation (Hadjisophocleous & Bénichou, 2000).
Historically, the conservative prescriptive approach was synonymous of
providing a large margin of safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents, and/or give
the means to mitigate their consequences if they occur (Meserve, 2000). Moreover,
when an accident happens, more prescriptions were generated to respond to the new
causes and effects of the new event. This approach included many assumptions and
oversimplification, especially because of the lack of extensive knowledge and sharp
scientific and technological tools that are available nowadays.
The main difference between a performance-based approach and a more
traditional prescriptive approach is finally the change from the angle of view of the
studied system: the traditional approaches are more specific and analytical, while
performance standards are more holistic and risk based.
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However, this paradigm shift implies also some practical consequences. For
instance, the prescriptive rules are easier to follow for the designers and
manufacturers, easier to control for third parties, namely classification societies and
maritime authorities, and relatively easy to implement for the legislators.
Nevertheless, the fundamental difficulties related to the use of the prescriptive
approaches, as well as the advances in scientific safety analysis, mainly in the risk
management field, increased the interest for the performance-based approaches.

Figure 6: Paradigm shift, from prescriptive to performance-based regulations

Thus, the main characteristics associated with prescriptive regulations are:
limited flexibility for architecture and reduced design optimization; difficulty of
application to new concepts; taking into account of the technical systems, unbalanced
and contradictory requirements of safety; little transparency; reactivity and continuous
amendments.
On the other hand, the characteristics associated with performance-based
codes are: flexibility; introduction of new concepts; explicit objectives of safety; proactivity and taking into account of nontechnical aspects such as human element.
These characteristics validate the preference for the performance-based approaches,
and justify the critical vision of the prescriptive approaches to maritime safety.
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Practically, the choice of a prescriptive or performance-based approach will
have the following impacts:
¾ Ships in construction: design and conformity
From the ship-builders perspective, prescriptive rules are easy to implement,
despite their complexities. They are incrusted in the shipyards building culture, and
therefore allow reduced conception and design delays, resulting in increasingly
shorter times of construction. The implementation of new performance-based rules
requires the development of new knowledge, new tools and a new culture. The
question arises concerning the times of design and construction. Thus, these new
changes will be reflected on the ship-building delays. Consequently, the ship-owners
needs will undoubtedly influence the degree of innovation of the yard, which will
create a new factor of competition within the ship-building industry.
The situation will be identical from the under-construction classification and
certification point of view. The new performance-based approach would generate new
knowledge and expertise needs, which will be reflected on the delays of classification
and certification.
¾ Ships in service: operation and control
With regard to the ships’ crew, relatively standardized ships and working
environments conform to traditional prescription create, from a first point of view, an
element of safety. New concepts would certainly impose new specific familiarization,
training, and competencies.
Finally, regarding the last shackle of the safety chain, the inspections and
surveys of ships that do not conform to standardized prescriptive requirements can be
problematic, either for statutory and classification surveys, or Port State inspections.
Thus, new training needs and new surveys and inspections regimes would be required.
A comparative review contrasting the advantages and disadvantages of theses
two approaches is summarized in Table 4 (Chantelauve, 2006; Hadjisophocleous &
Bénichou, 2000; Kuo, 1999 ; Tavares, 2008):
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Table 4: Prescriptive vs. Performance-based regulations
Regulation
approaches
Prescriptive

Merits

Drawbacks

• Straightforward concept, direct • Specification of the requirements
clear
statement
of
analysis
and
interpretation, without
noncomplex
application
and objectives.
evaluation.
• Inhibits innovative alternatives
• Setting reference standards to and inflexibility for innovation.
be met by anyone who wants to
• Difficulties of keeping up-to-date
build and operate a ship or marine
and
tends
to
lag
behind
vehicle.
technological advances.
• No requirements for specific
• Little promotion of costqualification or high levels of
effectiveness analysis.
engineering and expertise.
• Complex structure and need for
continuous amendments.
• Assume that there is only one
way to provide the required safety
level, and are not much open to
alternative solutions.
• Once the standard requirement
has been satisfied, there are little
incentives for operators to achieve
safety levels beyond.
• Possibility of imbalance because
of the influence of major disasters.

Performancebased

• Establishment
of
clearly • Difficulty to clearly quantifying
defined safety objective and the safety levels.
leaving to the engineers the
• Need for further education and
freedom of defining the criteria
training especially because of
and methodology to achieving
reduced comprehension especially
them.
during the first phases of
• Flexibility for introducing implementation.
innovative design solutions that
• Difficulties to analyze and
meet the performance criteria.
evaluate
the
compliance
of
• Harmonization of international “equivalent projects” with the
established standards.
standards.
of • Difficulties for the validation of
the methodologies and tools used for
defining the quantitative criteria.
• Facilitating the introduction of
innovative
technologies
and
knowledge
• Reduced
documents.

complexity

• Usage of cost-effectiveness
analysis, and allowing great
flexibility for the designer
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III.5. Factors influencing the choice of the regulation approach:
Both prescriptive and performance-based regulations have their merits and
drawbacks; thus the real strength lies in recognizing the factors that would favor one
concept or the other, and how to use both approaches in harmony. Now, an analysis of
the context in which a transition in the safety regulation regime can occur will be
made, and more precisely, the aspects influencing the choice of a prescriptive or
performance-based safety approach.
¾ The HSE “permissioning” regime
The U.K. Health & Safety Commission (HSC/E) suggests that a new safety
regime would be proposed, only where the “normal forms of regulation are not
sufficient and where the extra demands imposed by the regime are justified by the
benefits it brings” (U.K. HSE, 2003). It proposes that a combination of at least one
criterion in A and the criterion in B will help determining the need to generate a new
safety regime, called “permissioning” regime, which can be assimilated to the
performance-based approach.
Table 5: HSE criteria for determining the need for a “permissioning” regime
Criteria Description
A

•

There is a need to have regard to high, sustained and broadly based

levels of societal concern, either existing or likely, over potential risks of
harm (eg high levels of public dread or aversion associated with the
hazard and the vulnerability of those exposed to the hazard); and/or
•

There are significant risks of multiple fatalities from a single (or linked

series of) event(s); and/or
•

There are significant risks of widespread and significant adverse

effects on human health.
B

•

The proposed regime adds proportionate value in terms of risk control

and/or allows specific activities (with clear benefits to society) to proceed.
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¾ The UKOOA decision-making framework
In the document submitted by Japan to the 81st MSC session, related to the
safety level approach for Goal-Based new ship construction Standards (GBS), it is
proposed that the United Kingdom’s Offshore Operators Association framework for
risk-based decision making (UKOOA,1999), can be used to assist in risk-related
decision-making. The main purpose of this tool is evaluating different alternatives
during the feasibility studies and concept stages of a given project, in relation to
certain hazards such as fire, explosion, loss of stability and others (IMO, 2006a).
The framework’s model takes the form of a decisions’ spectrum, ranging from
decisions influenced by engineering parameters to decisions where the societal values
are important. At the right-hand side of the model are positioned characteristics which
indicate the decisional context; to the left, are indicated the means of calibration.
This approach establishes that the evaluation of the risks that can have a
significant impact for the decisions of the type B, implying uncertainties and
deviations from the usual best practice and standards. While for the decisions of the
type A and C, the evaluation of risk is still suitable, but has less influence on the final
decision. Accordingly, it can be noted that most IMO regulations fall within the “type
B” decisions category of the spectrum.

Figure 7: UKOOA decision-making Framework

International Maritime Organization. (2006a, February 5). Goal-Based new ship
construction Standards- Safety levels – Submitted by Japan. (MSC 81/6/3).
London: Author
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The framework is not intended to be a prescriptive method, and can be used
for a wide range of application (Yang & Al., 2001). However, its usage can be
complex and its interpretation can become subjective.
¾ ISM Code: a paradigm shift
The implementation of the ISM Code is recognized to be the first and most
significant paradigm shift, which was adopted by the IMO, to move toward a
proactive maritime safety. If applying the previously analyzed theories related to the
need for a transition in the regulation approach, it can be noted that, by the end of the
20th century, serious accidents continued to happen within the maritime industry,
despite the application of the relevant international rules and standards on board the
involved ships (Kletz, 2001), which raised great social anxieties regarding the safety
levels in the maritime field.
With regard to the HSE criteria for determining the need for a “permissioning”
regime, these conditions perfectly respond to the need for a transition toward a new
safety regime. Indeed, the conditions stated in the A and B rows of Table 5 are
combined in this case, which justifies the need to change the safety regime.
Accordingly, more responsibility was moved to the ship operator, who became
required to provide a Safety Management System that meets the safety objectives
fixed by the Code, establishes safeguards against all identified risks, and provides
evidence to prove the system’s safety is effectively managed. This transition
represented a noteworthy move toward the shipping industry self-regulation.
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Chapter Four
Risk management and proactive safety
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Chapter IV: Risk management and proactive safety
IV.1. Introduction
Basically, risk is incrusted in all safety aspects. If refering to the definition of
the term “safety”, which can be for instance “the term that is normally used to
describe the degree of freedom from danger” (Kristiansen, 2005), risk is the concept
that allows evaluating the levels of protection from hazards and thus the degree of
freedom from danger.
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) state that the evolution toward a proactive
“no-accident-is-tolerable” policy, which improves the safety levels of any industry,
can not be attained without applying adequate and effective risk management
strategies. Recently, The IMO finalized the consolidated text of the Guidelines for
Formal Safety Assessment, and thus, endeavors to generalize, where possible, the use
of risk management theories in its rule making process (IMO, 2007a).
In this chapter, the role of risk theories in developing proactive maritime
safety regime will be analyzed, and the difficulties faced by the risk-based approach
will be investigated. But first, the category to which the maritime safety regulation
belongs will be defined, and in the level in which it is positioned compared to other
industries’ safety systems will be identified.

IV.2. Categorization of safety control systems
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) associate the risk management strategies with
the related categories of accidents. Accordingly, three safety control categories can be
defined as follows:
•

Empirical safety control: focusing on safety systems where accident are

frequent but with relatively small consequences. This category deals with
occupational safety, where the hazards are controlled empirically by epidemiological
analysis of past accidents. The level of safety is measured by the “LTI” index (LostTime-Injuries), mainly used in the manufacturing and other relatively non-hazardous
industries.
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•

Evolutionary safety control: protecting against relatively unlikely accidents

that have medium impacts. The safety of this category of systems starts from the
improvement of the design reacting to the analysis of the “individual, latest major
accident”. The safety control is created by building up several lines of defense
against accidents. This approach is mainly focused on the removal of the causes of a
particular accident. Examples of application of this safety control approach could be
the aircraft and railways safety.
•

Analytical safety control: dealing with systems where accidents are rare, but

have heavy impacts. For this approach accidents will be so rare that the modeling can
not be based on empirical evidence from accident analysis. The risk is predicted and
modeled using probabilistic approaches (Probabilistic Risk Analysis “PRA”), based
on the estimation of likelihood of a simultaneous violation of all the designed safety
barriers. This safety concept mainly concerns very sensitive industries such as
nuclear or chemical sectors, where the pace of innovation is very fast and a “no-

Frequency of accidents

accident-is-tolerable” policy is applied (Rasmussen & Svedung 2000).

Figure 8: Rasmussen’s Categorisation of safety control systems

Rasmussen, J. & Svedung, I. (2000). Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society.
Borås: Sjuhäradsbygdens
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•

Safety control in the maritime sector:
Maritime safety can be regarded as a hybrid regime that combines both

empirical and evolutionary safety control approaches. Not only maritime regulation
deals with the occupational safety of people on board (personnel protection, and
working place safety), but also it sets the barriers that would prevent major accidents.
Also, the maritime safety regulation focuses both on removing the causes of accidents,
and the mitigation of their consequences in the unfortunate event they occur.
Accordingly, in its efforts to move toward a proactive safety, it is necessary
for IMO to set up methodologies that will allow identifying, assessing and managing
all risks associated with maritime activities. These risk-oriented methodologies would
constitute the framework upon which the holistic safety regime could be developed.

IV.3. Possible configurations of safety regimes
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001) define a safety regime as being the rules,
practices and ideas associated with the regulation and control of a risk or a particular
hazard. The configuration of safety regimes depends upon the approaches adopted for
the rule-making (deterministic or probabilistic), and the nature of the application
process (prescriptive or performance-based). The probabilistic approach is intended to
combine the evaluation of the frequency of an event with its level of consequence; it
can therefore be considered as a risk-based approach (Lassagne, 2004).

Table 6: classification of safety regimes
Rules making

Deterministic

Probabilistic

Prescriptive

Traditional

Risk based

Performance-based

Risk Based

Purely risk based

Rules application
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Accordingly, depending on the process adopted for the rule making and the
application methodologies, safety regulation can be classified in four categories as
follows:
•

Traditional approach: where the regulator prescribes technical requirements

based on previous experience or deterministic calculation. This approach corresponds
to the traditional maritime safety.
•

Purely risk-based approach: where rule making process is based upon

probabilistic calculation, associated with performance-based application codes,
mostly used in the nuclear sector where no accident can be tolerated.
•

Risk-based approach: in which either the performance-based rules are

generated from deterministic approach, or, prescriptive rules are based upon
probabilistic calculations e.g.: the regulator can impose specific technical solutions
drawn up from lessons generated by risk analysis techniques, which represent the
approach adopted for the proactive maritime safety.
These four principal categories can be supplemented by rules of equivalence,
e.g.: a prescriptive rule can be satisfied by equivalent solutions other than the
prescriptive requirements, as for SOLAS Chapter I/regulation 5.

Figure 9: Possible configuration of safety regulation
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IV.4. Safety and Risk management
The progressive evolution of a maritime safety regime toward a proactive
approach has various aspects. First of all by the introduction of risk analysis tools
in the development of prescriptive regulations, then by creating some openings within
the SOLAS Convention by offering the possibility to adopt innovative solutions that
provide equivalent levels of safety, also, within the framework of the rules
development for the High Speed Craft (HSC) for which existing prescriptive safety
requirement can not be enforced; finally, by enforcing requirements concerning the
safety and security management systems.
Focusing on all these safety concepts allows noticing that risk management is
a central point governing them. For instance, risk analysis will allow deciding whether
the alternative solutions to SOLAS requirements, or the HSC innovative technologies,
provide equivalent safety levels. Also, risk management tools are the backbone for
setting and verifying the safety margins of performance-based regulations.
Many authors were interested in the description of the techniques of risk
management and analysis in various sectors, such as financing, economy, banking,
contingency planning and other fields. The new tendency of a proactive maritime
safety regime is one of the fields of application of risk sciences, or more modestly, of
the techniques of risk control and management. In order to centre the remarks, the
following definitions are proposed:
•

Risk analysis: a process which objective is the estimation of the risk;

•

Risk assessment: confrontation of the risk levels with the criteria of risk
acceptability, with the objective of formalization of the Risk Control Options;

•

Risk management: the whole process including the selection of the suitable
Risk Control Options and their implementation in the management of the safety
of the considered activity.
The principle of risk management theory can be summarized in the Figure 10:
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Figure 10: Risk Management System

International Maritime Organization. (2006b, September 14). Manual on Oil Spill Risk
Evaluation and Assessment of Response Preparedness - Submitted by New Zealand.
(MEPC/OPRC-HNS/TG 5/3). London: Author

Hazard identification and risk assessment are arguably the most important
phases of a system safety lifecycle and often the most difficult. They are also a major
source of uncertainty as they greatly dependent on experts’ judgment (Moore, 2005).
These concepts can be classified as follows:
•

Hazard Identification

The identification of the hazards is mainly based on the opinion of experts,
with various backgrounds, who associate each function of the considered system with
the risks that result from it, the accidents to which they are exposed, the conditions
likely to lead to these potential accidents, and the consequences of these accidents in
the possibility where they occur. Diverse hazard identification techniques are essential
to ensure that all hazards are identified. These techniques include qualitative tools
such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) or
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Assessment (FMECA), (Securius & Al., 1999).
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•

Risk assessment:

Chantelauve (2006) distinguishes the deterministic risk analysis approaches,
which are interested in the consequences of an undesirable event, and the probabilistic
approaches which, either, evaluate the probability of an undesirable event, or evaluate
simultaneously its probabilities and consequences. It is also possible to make a
distinction between the approaches which are based on the evaluation of a failure, of a
cause or an impact, and approaches that make a combined evaluation of the
undesirable events.
Other approaches distinguish the qualitative from quantitative analysis. The
qualitative analyses mainly review the modes of failure of a system based on experts’
judgments, and try to describe the magnitude of potential consequences and likelihood
that those consequences will occur. The quantitative approaches aim to characterize
the level of risk by extrapolating numerical values of likelihood and consequences,
mainly from accidental data, and/or using various other techniques for modeling the
possible outcomes of a set of events. Halfway between the qualitative and quantitative
approaches, the semi-quantitative approach is mainly based on the judgment of
experts and the characterization of the level of risks using ranking scales such as risks
matrix. These approaches can be used jointly or separately (Shuohui, Xuejing, Shuang
& Xuan, 2006).
Finally, it can be concluded that a risk analysis technique may be classified in
various categories, and that the methods used generally represent a combination of
various techniques.

IV.5. Example of risk-based regulation: probabilistic damage stability
Ships’ stability and subdivision are covered by Chapter II-1 “Construction Structure, subdivision and stability, machinery and electrical installations” of the
SOLAS Convention. The subdivision of the ships into watertight compartments must
ensure that, after a hypothetical damage of the hull, the ship remains afloat in a stable
position. Two approaches exist for these problems: the “deterministic” approach and
the “probabilistic” approach.
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The object of the deterministic method is to ensure that ships can survive
without capsizing after the flooding of a fixed number of damaged compartments.
Recently, a more risk-based “probabilistic” concept which uses the probability of
survival after collision as a measure of ships’ safety in a damaged condition was
adopted, and entered into force on January, 01st 2009 (IMO, 2008).
The development of this approach is based on the study of statistical data from
the collision accidents analysis, which allowed establishing the probability of
damages at different positions of the ship. This study generated a diagram of the
damages, which can be used to make the design of the ships safer and more effective.
For instance, the study reveals that the forward part of the ship is subject to the most
important damages, and therefore its reinforcement will greatly improve the attained
subdivision index more than the reinforcement of other ship locations, which
corresponds to the Risk Assessment and Risk Control principles.
Accordingly, the new philosophy introduced by this concept is that two
different ships which have the same subdivision index “A” have equal safety levels
and, therefore, there is no need for special treatment of specific parts of the ship, even
if they are able to survive different random damages.
This approach enables evaluating the probability of ship’s survival: the
evidence of compliance with the rule is attained simply if the probability of calculated
survival is acceptable. This “probabilistic” concept, based on statistical facts of
collisions circumstances, allows obtaining a much more realistic image of the endured
risk for survivability after damage, as compared with the old “deterministic” methods
whose subdivision design principles are more theoretical than practical.
However, it should be noted that, still, some deterministic “minor damage”
principles are still used, especially for the development of passenger ships subdivision
rules, in order to avoid such ships being designed with what can be perceived as
“unacceptably vulnerable spots” in some parts of their length (IMO, 2008).
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IV.6. Difficulties associated with risk-based regulations:
The evolution toward proactive risk-based regulations includes a number of
difficulties that have to be overcome in order to control risks effectively. These
difficulties comprise the following:
•

Control Referential

The conformity with performance-based regulations can be more difficult to
prove as compared to the more traditional prescriptive regulations. Moreover, setting
a performance referential can be problematic, as the risk control options that will
allow setting the adequate safety levels depend on a multitude of parameters.
This problem actually covers another dilemma related to the fact that the
maritime authorities must have the adequate resources and expertise that allow, not
only delivering valuable judgments concerning the effectiveness of the risk control
measures and their proper implementation, but also the ability to carry analysis of the
adequacy of the used safety alternatives and innovative techniques to prove whether
they provide the required safety levels.
•

Increased costs for standard setting and application

Lassagne (2004) suggests that the costs associated with risk-based regulations,
paradoxically, proved to be higher than those related to the traditional simple
regulations, because of the important expertise and technicality required; however, the
author’s opinion is that they could never exceed the costs associated with overregulation and prescriptive rules, once the necessary knowledge would be acquired.
This new knowledge is required at the same time from the legislator’s side,
and also from the shipbuilders and ships operators parts, since they became
respectively requested to provide technical solutions and safety management systems
that meet the required performance and objectives.

40

Chapter IV: Risk management and proactive safety

•

ALARP concept and Public Perception

Risk acceptance criteria are continuously subject to diverse polemics, in spite
of many theoretical contributions attempting to solve this dilemma, such as the
Formal Safety Assessment in the maritime field.
It is argued that setting the Tolerable, Intolerable and ALARP regions is
greatly influenced by the public perception of risk. In fact, human understanding and
cultures are considered to be the backbone of the risk concepts, thus the acceptance
criteria will be influenced by many social factors, such as ethnic and social aspects,
and even the degree of trust accorded to the experts and legislators in charge of setting
the adequate protective and preventive solutions for controlling risks (Pidgeon et al.,
2003).
Practically, Beck (2004) states that what individuals perceive as risky will
depend on their values and their preferences. Thus, the ALARP border is dynamic and
moves with the wellness of each country. Figure 11 illustrates, for instance, the “Cost
of Averting a Fatality” for OECD countries. This graphic would certainly show much
bigger fluctuations if developing, or other non-OECD, Countries were included.

Figure 11: Cost of Averting a Fatality – OECD Countries (2002)
Kontovas C. A. (2005). Formal Safety Assessment: Critical Review and Future Role.
Unpublished Diploma thesis. National Technical University of Athens, School of
Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, Greece
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•

Dealing with uncertainties

Aven and Vinnem (2007) define risk as being the combination of the two
basic dimensions: possible consequences and associated uncertainties. Accordingly, it
can be argued that if uncertainties are suppressed, there would be no risk and safety
would be almost guaranteed. Nevertheless, full safety is practically unattainable,
especially for the complex systems such as the maritime sector mainly because of
human involvement.
Uncertainties are introduced at many levels of the development of a risk based
project, for instance hazard identification and qualitative analysis are based on
experts’ judgments, and it is obvious that nothing is more uncertain than human
opinion. Moreover, even the assignment of probability values and estimations of
consequences are based on a number of assumptions and suppositions that depend on
the quality and judgment of experts who often tend to make oversimplifications.
Hence, uncertainty needs to be carefully considered during the whole system
safety lifecycle, and should be reflected in the decision-making process. Nevertheless,
they should be progressively reduced, during the concretization of the projects, both
during the risk-based rules modeling and the system engineering process. The finality
is to bring the uncertainties within ALARP limits that provide acceptable confidence
and reliability (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Evolution of the uncertainties
during Risk Management and Engineering processes
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IV.7. Accidental elements
Shipping is continuously subject to the risk of occurrence of accidents and
incidents with significant consequences on human lives and the maritime environment.
Accordingly, it is indispensable to carry out casualty investigation, in order to collect
and analyse the data concerning the contributing and causation factors of the accidents,
and to produce the necessary input for the foresight of threats to maritime safety.
However, casualty statistics related to ships total loss, for instance, differ from
one data base to another (depending IMO, OECD, Lloyd Register and others), which
distort the general image of the attained safety levels. Also, it is noted that the
statistics concerning the sea events can reveal important variations, from one year to
the other, as described in Figure 13 (IMO, 2005a). However, when longer periods are
considered, it becomes possible to identify general tendencies, which follow a
relatively decreasing trend.
Nevertheless, the new proactive concept for maritime rule-making process
requires the development of unified taxonomies, and accident causation models, in
addition to the common international casualty data bases, such as the “GISIS”
developed by the IMO or the “EMCIP” developed by the European Maritime safety
Agency (EMSA). These new approaches will allow making in depth analysis, to
foresee realistic accident probabilities and impact values, which will allow reducing
risk uncertainties.
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Figure 13: Total loss of ships over 100 GT and lives lost at sea 1989-2004

International Maritime Organization. (2005, February 23). Casualty Statistics and
Invistigations – Very serious casualties for the year 2003. (FSI.3/Circ.6). London: Author.

43

Chapter IV: Risk management and proactive safety

IV.8. Chapter conclusions
This Chapter was interested in the categorization of the maritime safety
regime and the contribution of risk sciences to the safety regulation.
The change from a prescriptive and deterministic approach toward an
performance-based and probabilistic approach is underlined as being a shift toward
proactive risk-based regulations, which represent a change from microscopic and
specific approach to a more macroscopic and holistic concept.
The difficulties that would be faced by the new proactive regime were also
discussed, as well as the contextual conditions that would allow apprehending the
potential development of one approach or the other.
Finally, it can be argued that the regulation revolution is not perceptible in
the current context; progressive evolution supported by effective training is more
desirable. Thus, both traditional and risk-based approaches should continue to exist
side by side and complete each other. For instance, risk management tools can be
introduced in the process of elaboration of prescriptive requirements, similar to the
“risk informed” concept related to the nuclear industry; on the other hand, prescriptive
arrangement can be utilized to set the safety objectives and evaluate the conformity to
the performance-based regulations.
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V.1. General context
The British initiatives following the capsizing of the “Herald of Free
Enterprise” in 1987, led to approval, in 1997, of The Interim Guidelines for the
Application of Formal Safety Assessment to the IMO Rule-Making Process “FSA”
(MSC/Circ.829-MEPC/Circ.335), to be used within the IMO framework of rules
development (IMO, 1997). Subsequently, after experimental applications such as the
bulk carriers safety, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC.74 in 2001), and the
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC.47 in 2002), approved the IMO
“Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making
process” (MSC/Circ.1033-MEPC/Circ.392) (IMO, 2002), which were amended in
consecutively in 2005 and 2006 (IMO, 2005b; IMO, 2006c).
The objectives of the Formal Safety Assessment process are the improvement
of the maritime safety framework, including the protection of human life and the
preservation of the marine environment and goods, while being based on the risk
assessment and cost-benefit analysis principles. The FSA is a tool that can help
evaluating new rules related to the safety of ships and the protection of the marine
environment, or to carry out a comparative evaluation between existing rules and their
possible amendments and improvement, in order to get the “balance right” between
various technical and operational factors, including the human element, and the ships’
safety, the protection of the marine environment and the costs effectiveness.

Figure 14: FSA: Getting “the balance right”
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V.2. The FSA methodology
The FSA process consists of a structured rational and systematic methodology
aiming to:
•

Assess the risks related to maritime safety and the preservation of the

marine environment; and to
•

Evaluate the costs and benefits of IMO’s alternatives for the reduction

of these risks.
It comprises five steps, as illustrated in Figure 15, in addition to a preparatory stage of
problem definition (IMO, 2007a). These five steps are as follows:
•

Step 1: Hazard Identification (HAZID);

•

Step 2: Risks Analysis;

•

Step 3: Risks Control Options (RCO);

•

Step 4: Cost/Benefit assessement (CBA); and

•

Step 5: Recommendations for the decision-making.

Figure 15: Illustrative flowchart of the FSA framework (IACS-MSC 75, 2002)

International Maritime Organization. (2006d, August 29). Formal Safety assessmentPossible improvements on FSA Guidelines Submitted by Greece. (MSC 82/INF.3). London:
Author

47

Chapter V: FSA: a risk-based rule making process

V.2.1. The preparatory stage
The FSA process must be preceded by preliminary work to define the problem
that will be assessed. It includes the definition of the type of ship to be studied, the
specification of relevant constraints, and the delimitation of depth and extent of the
study itself. This work will also allow gathering all available information and data
related to accidents, incidents and reliability elements for the considered subject. The
accuracy of this stage is fundamental for the rest of the FSA studies, as it will
influence the whole rest of the project. In fact, a deficient appreciation in this stage
can lead to erroneous assessments of major risks during the FSA process.
However, the consistency of the collected data, its detail and the effectiveness
of the methodologies used throughout the process is often not guaranteed, which
handicaps the progress of the FSA study. For instance, the FSA study on bulk carriers
took about 30 months to be achieved (December 1999- May 2002) (IMO, 2006d).
In this context, in order to refine the problem and to help selecting the
adequate theories and methodologies to be applied, a generic model is defined at this
stage (IMO, 1998). It will not be regarded as a particular ship, but rather as a whole of
systems including operation, organization, management, human factor, and equipment
as illustrated in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Principle functions related to the generic ship

Boisson, P. (1996). FSA : a new approach to safety at sea. Bulletin Technique du
Bureau Veritas, 3, 7-20.
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V.2.2. Step 1: Hazard Identification
The object of this first step of the FSA study is to identify all potential
hazardous situations related to the considered problem and to prioritize them
according to their risk levels. It combines creative and analytical tools (IMO, 2006d).
This combination ensures the proactivity of the whole process and allows avoiding
the confinement to hazards that happened in the past.
This step includes two phases: a phase of identification and a phase of ranking.
• Identification
A Maritime Hazard can generically be defined as:
Any scenario or situation that, if not contained, would present an
intolerable threat to maritime safety.
The Hazard Identification process is generally based on the opinion of a group
of experts, from various fields, who associate each function of the considered system
with the risks which result from it, and the accidents to which they are exposed, the
conditions likely to lead to these potential accidents, and the consequences of these
accidents in the possibility where they occur (Lassagne, 2004) Several standardized
techniques can be used, according to the studied problem: such as HAZOP, FMECA or
What If theories (see Annex A).
Kontovas, Psaraftis & Zachariadis (2007) notice that for most of the
accomplished FSA studies, hazard identification has mainly, if not exclusively, been
based on historical data, because it is deemed that where historical data is available,
there is no need to generate scenarios in order to model the risk profile. However, the
use of historical data alters the proactive philosophy behind the whole process. Thus,
this tendency could not be used for innovative designs or probabilistic failures
modeling, where effective scenarios have to be developed using more elaborate tools.
Finally, it can be argued that, since only the hazards that have been identified
during this step would be analyzed during the whole FSA process, the accuracy and
exactness of this stage are vital for the rest of the study.
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• Ranking
The second goal of this step is developing a ranking list of the identified
hazards, generally starting from the most severe scenarios, to end by eliminating the
scenarios that are judged to have negligible significance. The evaluation uses
qualitative tools at this stage of the analysis. The identified hazards are classified
using an index of frequency vs. severity, and generally allows generating a qualitative
risk matrix that represents a visual evaluation of the risk associated with each hazard.
This step is considered to be a less formal one, mainly based upon the “know
how” of the experts and their “good sense”. Thus, mathematical and behavioural
approaches would be necessary to evaluate these opinions. Accordingly, the decision
making for this step uses tools such as the “concordance coefficient (W)” to evaluate
the correlation between the experts’ estimations. This coefficient is calculated on the
basis of a formula that correlates the group of experts’ ranking of a number of hazards,
and varies between 0 and 1. Hence, it is accepted that the experts attain good
agreement where this coefficient is W>0.7 (IMO, 2006d). Kontovas (2005), states that,
mostly, a group of 10 experts allows having a good stability of this coefficient, and
that the more hazards have to be studied the less number of experts should be used.
Moreover, as proposed by Dourmas, Nikitakos and Lambrou (2007), more
scientific numerical approaches such as the Bayesian network models or the fuzzy
logic theory, should be developed further, to analyze and evaluate the experts’
decision-making framework.
V.2.3. Step 2: Risk Analysis
The objective of this stage is to make a detailed analysis of the hazards
identified in the previous step, especially the most severe ones, in order to identify
and quantify the causes and consequences of the high risk areas. FSA guidelines
suggest the use “Risk Contribution Tree (RCT)” concept at this stage. This model
combines Fault Trees and Event Trees, which respectively allow displaying graphical
representations of the logic combination of causes which lead to an undesirable event,
and how the consequences of accidents may develop to result in different magnitude
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of loss. The quantification requires accidental reliability data, and any other suitable
source of information, particularly, valuable expert judgments.
Also, it is recommended that risk could be expressed in two categories,
namely, the “individual risk” and the “societal risk”. The first category estimates the
risk for a particular individual at a particular location, in order to ensure that persons
who may be involved in ships’ accidents are not exposed to excessive risk. The
second category displays a more comprehensive picture of particular risks from ships
to societies as a whole, taking into account their geographical distribution. Societal
Risk is generally expressed in the form of F-N curves which represents the frequency
(F) in function of a number (N), or more, of fatalities. These F-N diagrams allow
displaying a more realistic picture of the societal perception of risk, as 1000 accidents
that kills 1 person are not be perceived as equivalent to 1 accident which kills 1000
persons for instance (society is less willing to accept the latter case). An example of
FN diagram is given in Figure 17.
Finally, it can be argued that the units used in the FSA studies submitted to
IMO are mainly the Potential Loss of Life (PLL), number of fatalities, ship loss,
environmental harm or frequency of casualties. This can cause some confusion,
therefore a common quantification unit would be recommended in this stage; this unit
could be similar to the universal unit used in the CLC or Fund conventions.

Figure 17: Example of F-N Curve for different types of ships

Skjong, R. (2002). Risk acceptance criteria: current proposals and IMO position. Retrieved
June 25, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://research.dnv.com/skj/Papers/SkjValencia.pdf
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It can, regrettably, be noted from Figure 17 the high likelihood that the total
number of crew members of bulk carriers (approximately 20 persons) looses their
lives in the unfortunate event of casualty.
V.2.4. Step 3: Risk Control Options (RCOs)
According to the FSA guidelines (2007), the purpose of this step is generating:
“effective and practical RCOs and comprises the following four principal stages:
.1 focusing on risk areas needing control;
.2 identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs);
.3 evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating step 2;
.4 and, grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options.”
Thus, this step consists in identifying possible Risk Control Measures (RCMs),
and gathering them to establish practical regulatory options (RCOs). The Guidelines
suggest focusing on the following aspects:
•

Firstly, on prioritizing accidents for which the risk level is unacceptable;

•

Secondly, on the probability for the branches of the RCTs which present
strong probabilities of occurrence whatever are their consequences.

•

Thirdly, on the gravity, by identifying the fields of the RCTs which
contribute to very severe consequences; these fields have also to be
evaluated whatever is their probability;

•

Finally, on the reliability, by identifying the fields for which the RCT
indicates great uncertainty with regard to the endured risk.
Subsequently, RCOs are analyzed during structured group examination, in

order to estimate the risk reduction (ΔR) associated with each RCO. Dourmas,
Nikitakos and Lambrou (2007) state that estimating ΔR in a numerical mode,
according to historical data, cannot be proactive in the true sense of the term. Thus, it
is suggested that the estimation should rather be based on the use of risk matrices and
qualitative approaches to ensure the proactive aspect of the whole concept.
This step will allow generating:
.1 a set of RCOs which will be assessed for their risk reduction and cost/benefit
effectiveness;
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.2 a list of interested parties involved in the identified RCOs; and
.3 a list illustrating the interdependencies and possible combinations between the
identified elementary RCOs.
V.2.5. Step 4: Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)
In this stage, the costs associated with the implementation and maintenance of
each RCO, generated during the previous step, will be evaluated for the whole
lifetime of the vessel, as well as the benefits gained for the same time period. This
step marks the end of the qualitative approach used in the previous stages, as
quantitative tools will now be used to estimate and compare the cost effectiveness of
each RCO, in terms of cost per ΔR unit. These calculations are the basis for the
decision-making on the RCOs.
Several indexes are used to express the cost-effectiveness ratio related to the
human life safeguard. Indeed, IMO prefers to use the term “Cost for averting a
fatality (CAF)” instead of “cost of a human life” or “cost of a fatality” as human life
can not be valued. Thus, indexes such as “Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (GCAF)”
and “Net Cost of Averting a Fatality (NCAF)” are used. Other indexes, such as the
“Cost of Averting a Spill Criterion (CATS)”, which are based on the damage and the
impacts on the environment and installations, are also utilized for the analysis of the
costs/benefits related to such questions (Kontovas, Psaraftis & Zachariadis, 2007).
Subsequently, the cost effectiveness of the RCOs is calculated on the basis of such
indexes. The Gross and Net CAFs are calculated as follows:

GCAF =

ΔC
ΔR

NCAF =

ΔC − ΔB
ΔR

Where:
•

ΔC is the cost of the considered RCO per ship.

•

ΔB is the economic benefit per ship gained from the implementation of the
RCO (may also include the pollution prevention and the prevention of a
ship’s total loss) (IMO, 2004a).
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•

ΔR is the reduction of the risk per ship, in terms of a number of fatalities
averted, rising from the implementation of the RCO.
Francescutto (2005) proposes an alternative concept, frequently applied by the

HSE in modern risk assessments, commonly called implied cost of averting a fatality
(ICAF), and which expresses the risks and costs as a ratio as follows:

ICAF =

Net cost of the measure
Reduction in fatality risks

This ratio is dimensional, e.g. using monetary units such as £ or $ spent per
averted fatality. This approach avoids “losing” the valuation of risks to life within the
calculation, and keeps it explicit. However, the choice of adequate ICAF must still be
decided, in order to decide which RCO to adopt.
The advantages and weaknesses of the CBA analysis are summarized in Table 7:
Table 7: Advantages and weaknesses of the CBA Analysis

Advantages

Weaknesses

Makes the safety vs. cost analysis process Difficult to estimate the value of life, the
explicit and traceable

process may be considered unethical and
CBA results may not be widely accepted
and can provoke hostile reactions.

Standardization of safety investments

Many factors cannot be adequately
converted into monetary values, and
should therefore be given equivalent
weight in the decision-making process.

Ability to evaluate the costs and benefits Costs for averting fatalities are based on
of a specific measure without knowing Life Quality Index (LQI), which is
the risks on the whole installation.

dynamic and changes with the wellness
of the countries, thus, ICAF should
continuously be reviewed.

Gives a clear image of the investment for Sensitive, some assumptions made during
the implementation of each individual this step may greatly change the results of
RCO that helps decision-makers.

the whole FSA process
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V.2.6. Step 5: Recommendations for Decision-Making:
In this final step of the FSA study, final recommendations are formalized and
forwarded to decision makers aiming for safety improvement. The recommended
RCOs should both be “cost effective” and reduce the risk to the “desired safety
levels”. The review of the FSA studies presented to IMO allows noticing that they at
least:
•

Draw up the list of the principal hazards, risks, costs and benefits identified
during the evaluation;

•

Explain the basis for the important assumptions, the extent and the principal
limits of the study, the models and the techniques used for the evaluations
and the recommendations,

•

Describe the sources, and the main uncertainties associated with the
evaluation and/or the recommendations,

•

Describe the composition and competences of the group of experts who were
involved in the FSA study.
V.3. Human factor
The announced IMO’s objectives for the 2000s include emphasizing the

importance of people for developing a maritime safety culture. Accordingly, shifting
toward proactive maritime safety implies the need for better understanding the role of
the human element in accident causation and consequence mitigation, in order to
enhance the rule-making framework. In fact, it is stipulated in the FSA guidelines that:
“Human element issues [……] should be systematically treated within the FSA
framework, associating them directly with the occurrence of accidents, underlying
causes or influences. Appropriate techniques for incorporating human factors should
be used” (IMO, 2007a).
Particularly, the IACS gave great importance to the human factor and its
structured incorporation into the FSA guidelines. Thus, the IACS developed a “Draft
Guidance on Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) within Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA)” (IMO, 1999) for its incorporation in the FSA guidelines. This proposal was
finally integrated into the FSA guidelines (IMO, 2002).
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The 2007 FSA guidelines’ appendix named “Guidance on Human Reliability
Analysis (HRA)”, proposes the incorporation of the human factor into the FSA studies,
by the use of Human Reliability Analysis Techniques, which were developed
originally by the nuclear sector (Chantelauve, 2006). These techniques provide a
support at the first three stages of the FSA methodology, as illustrated in Figure 18.
The HRA process usually includes the following stages:
1. Identification and analysis of the key tasks;
2. Identification and analysis of the possible human errors; and,
3. Quantification of human reliability.
The appendix mentions that substantial benefit can be drawn up from the
qualitative use of HRA techniques during the stage of hazard identification. It also
recognizes that the data available for a quantification of human reliability are rare, and
that the experts’ judgments are the more adapted means for the quantification.

Figure 18: Incorporation of HRA into the FSA process

International Maritime Organization. (2007a, May 14). Formal Safety assessment Consolidated text of the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in
the IMO rule-making process (MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392). (MSC
83/INF.2). London: Author.
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V.4. Discussion and conclusions
The formal safety assessment process can be considered to be the first rational
attempt of using the risk analysis approach for the IMO rule making framework. The
main objective of this concept is to provide a transparent and clearly justified
decision-making process, which promotes the proactive safety regulation concept in
opposition to the existing system, which functioned only in reaction to accidents.
Accordingly, several FSA studies were carried out, associating many partners,
particularly the European Union and IACS members (for instance the SAFEDOR and
HARDER projects), for different types of ships such as high speed craft, bulk
carriers, container ships and LNG carriers (IMO, 2009).
These studies resulted, for some applications, in new requirements such as the
amendments to the High Speed Craft Code (HSC Code), to the SOLAS Chapter XI
related to safety of bulk carriers (especially the Double Side Skin “DSS”
requirements), and the new regulations concerning the helicopter deck on board
passenger ships, even though some of these regulations are still creating polemics
after their adoption.
However, the whole FSA process is still meeting a number of
oppositions, associated with the perception that the FSA is likely to lead to
considerations which are disconnected from the reality, especially because of its
dependence on experts’ judgments for the Hazard Identification, Risk Reduction
calculations and cost benefits analysis. In fact these steps depend on qualitative
approaches, which can suffer from bias, and reduced credibility because of the
associated uncertainties, and the lack of confidence inside the IMO bodies and
member states.
Moreover, as opposed to the safety case, which is enforced by the UK on
British offshore

installations,

the

FSA

studies

would

generate proactive

recommendations that will be implemented on board international fleets. This aspect
is problematic in itself, as it will be difficult to convince member states, which have
various ethnics, diverse cultures and especially different interests, that the proposed
step-forward regulations would bring the risk within acceptable limits. In fact the
perception of these acceptable risk limits differs from one society to another.
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Finally, it can be argued that, in spite of these oppositions, the FSA process is
still an indispensable tool that can even be used in proactive safety aspects, other than
the rule-making process, such the individual assessment of safety levels for
performance-based regulations or to support the “Goal Based Standards” framework.
In fact, the generalization of the FSA process application for these innovative
maritime safety approaches, would allow identifying its limitations, which will permit
reducing the uncertainties, increasing the reliability of the whole process, and
essentially will promote the generation of effective improvement measures.
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Chapter VI: Aspects of the proactive rules application
VI.1. Introduction
In the 2000s, new performance-based concepts were introduced by the IMO
for the application of its instruments. These concepts are mainly established by
SOLAS regulation II-2/17 related to the Fire Safety Design and Arrangements, and
the Goal Based Standards for shipbuilding. In this Chapter, a review of the regulatory
framework of these concepts will be provided, and the “state-of-affairs” concerning
the application of these approaches will be investigated.

VI.2. Alternative Fire Safety Design and Arrangements
VI.2.1. General Context
Traditional fire safety regulations, which were mainly created in response to
specific accidents, hardly became applicable to innovative ship design and building
technologies. Consequently, in 1998, the Fire Protection Sub-Committee (FP42)
created a working group in charge of a comprehensive review of SOLAS Chapter II-2,
which would consider the introduction of more performance-based instruments based
on risk management theories. In this context, the revised Chapter II-2 of SOLAS
Convention was adopted in 2000, and entered into force on July 1st, 2002, including a
new Regulation II-2/17 related to the alternative design and arrangements.
According to this Regulation, the fire safety design and arrangements can
deviate from the prescriptive requirements set out in the other parts of Chapter II-2,
provided that all fire protection objectives and the functional fire safety requirements
are fulfilled. It is also required that when the fire safety design and arrangements
deviate from the prescriptive requirements, an engineering analysis, and an evaluation
and approval of the alternative design and arrangements should be carried out.
Thus, in order to provide uniform guidance for the proper application of these
rules, the Maritime Safety Committee approved, in its 74th session (2001), the
Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for Fire Safety (IMO, 2001a),
which were amended in 2005 (IMO, 2005c).
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These guidelines give additional descriptions of the methodology to be
followed when carrying out engineering analysis and approval of innovative fire
safety design and arrangements which deviate from the prescriptive rules of SOLAS
Chapter II-2.
VI.2.2. The new proactive fire safety framework
Since 2002, the new SOLAS Chapter II-2 “Construction - fire protection,
detection, extinction” enables the designers to conceive arrangements which do not
fulfill the prescriptive requirements. However these alternative designs should at least
meet the fire safety objectives of Chapter II-2, which can be summarized as follows:
•

Preventing the occurrence of the fire and the explosion;

•

Reducing the risk caused by the fire to human life;

•

Reducing the risk of damage caused by the fire to the ship, its cargo and the
environment;

•

Confining, controlling and removing the fires and explosions in the
compartment of origin; and,

•

Providing adequate and easily accessible means of evacuation for the crew
and the passengers.
Chantelauve (2006) proposes that the fire safety objectives can be illustrated

in a “Fire Safety Tree” Concept as follows:

Figure 19: SOLAS Chapter II-2 “Fire Safety Tree”
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Accordingly, in order to achieve the fire safety objectives, functional
requirements are incorporated in Chapter II-2 which require:
•

The Division of the ship in main vertical and horizontal zones;

•

The Separation between accommodation areas and other spaces;

•

The Restriction in the utilization of combustible materials;

•

The Detection, confinement and extinction of fires in the zone of origin;

•

The Protection of the means of evacuation and access for the fire control;

•

The Availability of the extinguishing equipment; and,

•

The Minimization of the possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapors
(Chantelauve, 2006).
Therefore, in order to be in conformity with the SOLAS Chapter II-2, ships

have to satisfy one of the three following options:
1. Being designed and equipped in conformity with the prescriptive
requirements of the whole Chapter II-2;
2. Being fully designed and equipped according to the regulation II-2/17
“alternative Design and arrangements”, the design and the arrangements of
the ship, as a whole, should be re-examined and approved according to same
regulation; or,
3. Parts of the design and arrangements of the ship were re-examined and
approved according to Chapter II-2/Part F Regulation 17, and the remaining
parts are in conformity with the related prescriptive requirements.

VI.2.3. IMO Guidelines for the approval of Alternatives Design
The analysis intended to prove that the proposed alternative design or
arrangements achieve safety levels which are, at least, equivalent to those ensured by
the prescriptive regulations and standards of SOLAS Chapter II-2. The concept is
based on a two stages principle: a qualitative preliminary stage and a quantitative
stage. These stages are examined hereafter:
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¾ Qualitative preliminary stage
The preliminary analysis is intended to define the concept in qualitative terms,
i.e. to clearly define the area of application of the considered design and arrangement
and the rules and standards related to them. It also covers the examination of the
objectives and functional requirements of the regulation, in order to generate fire
scenarios and any other proactive testing concepts, which should mainly be based on
the risk management and control science. The testing concept should also take into
consideration the external elements such as human factors, vessel operations, and
management (IMO, 2001a)
¾ Quantitative stage
The quantitative analysis allows making a technical evaluation of the
alternative arrangements and carrying out adequate tests in quantitative terms, i.e.:
•

Quantifying specific fires of reference and fire scenarios (including elements
such as heat transfer, smoke, flame heights and generation of toxic gases),

•

Developing performance criteria based on the acceptable prescriptive
performance criteria;

•

Ensuring the adequacy of the selected safety margins; and,

•

Evaluating the performance of the trial alternative designs taking into
consideration the selected performance criteria.
Risk analysis is a major component of the alternative design approval process,

both for identification of fire scenarios during the preliminary analysis, and during the
quantitative analysis. The objective is not to build a design with “zero risk”, but to
achieve safety levels that are at least equivalent to the traditional arrangements.
Likewise the FSA process discussed in the previous chapter, the historical and
statistical data are also of a great importance, in order to estimate the reliability of the
system. Also the same techniques, such as “PHA”, “FMECA”, “HAZOP”, and group
of experts brain storming and judgments are used. Therefore, the FSA framework
could provide an efficient analysis tool for maritime administrations and other
approval bodies in charge of the analysis and approval of an innovative design or
arrangement for maritime fire safety.

63

Chapter VI: Aspects of the proactive rules application

VI.2.4.

Principal

Applications

of

“alternative

design

and

arrangements”
The principal applications of “alternative design and arrangements” have, until
now, mainly concerned passenger ships. A review of the reports related to the subject
which were submitted to the IMO, allows noticing that three categories of
arrangements have been introduced as follows:
¾ Movable fire walls in main vertical zones
Many cruising ships have “promenades” and “atriums” containing shopping
centers, public cafees, restaurants and other public spaces. These atriums extend on
the full length of the ship. However According to SOLAS Convention an A60
transversal vertical bulkhead is required every 48m in order to divide the ship in main
vertical zones.
The proposed solution of “Movable fire walls in main vertical zones”, ensure
the division of the ship in vertical zones, when they are in the closed position, but they
cannot satisfy other prescriptive requirements, especially related to the “Openings in
Main Fire Bulkheads”, because of technical and economical feasibility reasons.
Accordingly, an FSA study of the identified risks have been carried out, which
included elements such as temperature, smoke, toxicity, visibility and the evacuation
time. This study allowed generating the necessary recommendations and measures for
ensuring that the proposed safety levels are equivalent to those specified in SOLAS
regulation II-2/9.2.2.1 (IMO, 2007b).
The comparative engineering analysis of the performances shows that the
alternative design provides safety levels which are equivalent to the traditional design.
Thus it becomes possible to have a pleasant walk over the entire length of the ship.
¾ Lift with no separate machinery room
The SOLAS regulation II-2/9.2.2.5 “Protection of stairways and top spins in
accommodation area” requires the machinery room to be separated from the lifts
located within the limits of the stairways. The performance of the alternative
arrangement was compared with an equivalent prescriptive design, where the
machinery room is located at the top or in the lower part of the lift cage.
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The comparative evaluation shows that the alternative design is better than a
prescriptive design with a top machinery room, and definitely better than a
prescriptive design with a bottom machinery room (IMO, 2004b), as illustrated in
Table 8. The alternative design allows, also, making great profits in terms of gained
space.
Table 8: Comparison of safety performance for ship’s lifts arrangements
Effect

Alternative design

Heat

Better

Smoke

Better

Reference

Worse

Toxicity

Better

Reference

Worse

Reduced visibility

Better

Reference

Worse

Evacuation time

Better

Reference

Worse

Commonly used acceptable prescriptive
designs
Machinery room
Machinery room
above
below
Reference
Worse

International Maritime Organization. (2004b, December 08). International Convention for the
Safety of Life At Sea, 1974 – Alternative arrangements accepted under regulation II-2/17 Lift
with no separate machinery room. (SLS.14/Circ.235). London: Author.

¾ Class B-15 bulkheads in cabin corridor
Ship builders try to design cabins, which are increasingly more luxurious, in
order to satisfy the requests of their customers. In parallel they have to be in
conformity with prescriptive fire safety requirements, such as SOLAS regulation II2/9.2.2.2 related B-15 Bulkheads in cabin corridors. The proposed alternative
arrangement provide safety levels equivalent to the prescriptive requirement of having
“continuous B-15 walls and ceiling construction (forming B-15 tunnel)”, and that give
flexibility to designer for making luxurious designs (IMO, 2007c).
Therefore, it can be argued that these openings within the SOLAS Convention
which allow designers to conceive innovative fire safety alternatives are still not
effectively exploited. Mainly three alternatives have been developed, and become
similar to traditional prescriptive regulations, as they are strictly applied by designers
on new ships, even though they were developed to deviate from prescriptive
regulations. Consequently, performance based regulations can be regarded as giving
the designer the opportunities to develop a new kind of prescriptive regulations that fit
his conception orientations, and provide equivalent safety levels.
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VI.3. Goal Based Standards
VI.3.1. Background
Alternative design and arrangements are made possible under various IMO
instruments, such as:
•

The MARPOL Convention regulations I/5 on equivalence and I/19 related to
the acceptance of alternative design of oil tanker provided that equivalent
protection levels against pollution in the event of grounding or collision are
provided compared to the prescriptive design;

•

The latest amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and III (regulations II-1/55
and III/38) which will enter into force on 1 July 2010 (IMO, 2006e), related
respectively to the alternative design and arrangements of machinery and
electrical installations, and life-saving appliances and arrangements, in
addition to the previously discussed SOLAS regulation II-2/17 related to the
alternative fire safety design and arrangements; and finally,

•

Articles 8 and 9 of the International Convention on Load Lines (LL 66)
respectively related to equivalent arrangements and approvals for
experimental purposes.
However, the most ambitious development toward a risk-based approach

philosophy in the design and approval of new ship construction was proposed to the
78th MSC Committee in February 2004 jointly by Greece, the Bahamas and the IACS.
This proposal is related to the development of standards for the construction of ships
entirely based on performance and safety objectives, namely the “Goal-Based
Standards” (GBS); the accent being placed for the moment on the ships’ structural
requirements (IMO, 2004c).
It can be argued that this proposal is a fully “proactive initiative” as it has not
been developed to respond to a particular disaster, but rather to make use of the latest
scientific tools and theories that promote innovation, and provide flexible and costeffective ways of dealing with safety, especially for the knowledge-intensive and
safety-critical ships.
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VI.3.2. The five-tier GBS system
The Goal-Based Standards approach has been developed on the basis of a fivetier system, as illustrated in Figure 20. The first three tiers constitute the core of the
concept and consist of:
•

Tier I: defining the safety goals to be achieved and controlled during the
design, construction and the whole life cycle of the ship, in terms of
environmental performance, structural safety and construction quality.

•

Tier II: identifying functional requirements that will ensure the fulfillment
of safety goals described in tier I and would represent benchmarks for audits
of protection against corrosion or structural and residual resistance.

•

Tier III: setting the criteria of checking the conformity with the safety
objectives-based standards at the stages of design, validation of construction
and follow-up throughout the service life of the ship, and for the certification.
Tiers IV and V respectively correspond to the technical guidelines and

procedures developed by the IMO, Administrations and/or Recognized Organizations
(ROs) for the design of ships to meet Objectives of tiers I and functional requirements
of Tiers II; and, the industry’s common standards and practices applied during ships’
design and construction (Hoppe, 2005).

Figure 20: IMO GBS system

Papanikolaou, A. & Alissafaki, A.(2005). Introduction to the Goal-Based Standards.
Thematic Network SAFER EURORO II, Newsletter, 5. Retrieved June 10, 2009,
from the World Wide Web:
http://www.safereuroro.org/restricted/SAFER_EURORO_II-Deliverable_D7Draft.pdf
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VI.3.3. Recent developments in the GBS system
In February 2009, the IMO published the “Guidelines on approval of riskbased ship design” for Goal-Based New Ship Construction Standards. This document
contains general principles, which are intended to be used, by authorities and design
teams during the process of approval of risk-based designed ships, in all areas of ship
design. It is also deemed that this document provides a useful tool when dealing with
the approval of alternative designs and arrangements (IMO, 2009).
More recently, the MSC approved the “international Goal-Based ship
construction standards for bulk carriers and oil tankers”, and finalized a proposal of
amendments to SOLAS Chapter II-1 making the application of these Standards
mandatory, to be considered at the next MSC 87th session, with a view to adoption.
The future amendments would introduce a new SOLAS regulation II-1/3-10
on “Goal-based ship construction standards for bulk carriers and oil tankers” for oil
tankers and bulk carriers of 150 m or more. This regulation would require new ships
to be “designed and constructed for a specified design life, and to be safe and
environmentally friendly, in intact and specified damage conditions, throughout their
life” (IMO, 2009).

VI.4. Comments and Conclusions
New safety compliance approaches such as the SOLAS regulation II-2/17
related to the “alternative design and arrangements” or the “Goal-Based Standards”
(GBS) constitute a logical result of the initiatives undertaken for reforming the
maritime safety regulation methodologies, under the new knowledge gained from
advancement in technology and the great development in the field of risk analysis.
This new approach created a dynamic safety regime, capable of reacting to
changes in engineering practices and evolving technologies. Thus, the IMO Goals and
Performance Safety Standards should be sensitive to the technological progress and
innovation, and also to the changes in public and political risk perception.
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Thus, the biggest dilemma of the whole process is setting transparent and
verifiable criteria that reflect the safety goals and performances, during the whole lifetime of the ship.
Moreover, compliance with function and performance-based requirements,
such as the GBS approach, can be a complex and “knowledge-intensive” process.
Thus, the monitoring of the design, building and operation stages would require the
involvement of highly skilled naval architect having adequate risk science knowledge.
Consequently, the following options occur:
- Maritime Administration would upgrade their manpower, by employing
highly skilled marine surveyors who have the necessary naval architecture and risk
management backgrounds, and providing them with new control tools and equipment,
necessary for the approval and monitoring of innovative safety alternatives.
Consequently, surveying costs would increase and ship-owners would, probably,
support these extra-charges; or,
- More responsibility would be delegated to the Classification Societies,
especially the IACS members, who are major actors behind the development of these
new proactive safety alternatives. In fact, IACS members already acquired great
expertise in this field, and have the necessary specialized manpower able to carry out
this job. Thus, it is much probable that Flag States, which already delegated statutory
surveys to recognized organizations, would neither monitor new Goal-Based
Standards, nor endeavor to set performance criteria that fit their real safety objectives,
but rather place “Blind” confidence on their ROs, with all the possible consequences
of this process;
An evasive attitude can also be adopted by what can be called by “less
performing” Flags, which would use these new concepts for attracting “Sub-standard”
ship-owners, by adopting low safety criteria and delegating the approval and
monitoring processes of the Goal-Based Standards to “2nd range” ROs. This attitude
can have dangerous repercussions on the safety levels, as Port State Authorities could
not refuse safety standards that were approved under Flag State’s criteria.
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Thus, the whole GBS and performance-based philosophy can be threatened by
these Flag States, and new instruments should be given to Port State Authorities, such
as refusing the right to enter their ports to the ships built and operated under the
Authority of Flag States, which have “non-credible” GBS or alternative arrangements
approval methodologies.
Consequently, the new proactive safety approaches would require a new
transparent and auditable surveying regime, which allows ensuring that ships are built
and operated under reasonable safety standards, during their whole life cycle. This
initiative will be discussed in the next VIIth Chapter.
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Chapter VII: Risk-based Ship Inspection Regime
VII.1. Introduction
The move toward a proactive maritime safety regime requires ships to be
designed, built and operated according to safety goals and objectives. Accordingly,
the aim of the new safety approach is defining clear performance criteria that can be
measured, monitored and verified by Flag States, at any time during the whole life
cycle of the ship.
Thus, designers get the flexibility to introduce concepts with a high degree of
novelty, and the freedom to benefit from the latest advances in technologies and risk
analysis theories, which makes today’s ship design complex, and some times ahead of
the traditional rules and regulations.
Nevertheless, at the last shackle of the safety chain, namely safety inspection
and surveying regime, ships are still surveyed according to prescriptive requirements,
dictated by relevant IMO instruments and Classification Rules. However, this
prescriptive approach does not encourage the analysis of the specific threats to the
ship’s navigability, the consequences of damage and the risks of structural
deterioration.
It also does not allow benefiting from good operating practice and managing
inspection resources to focus on the areas of greatest concern (HSE, 2004).
Consequently, a more flexible inspection approach using risk concepts for managing
the ships’ inspection plan, can be considered as an indispensable component of the
proactive maritime safety philosophy.
Similar to the GBS concept, this conceptual attempt for studying a risk based
ship inspection regime will be limited to the ships’ structural inspection, and will
mainly be based on the experienced gained in this field by the nuclear and offshore
sectors.
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VII.2. Motivation for Risk Based Inspections
Prescriptive inspections are mainly time-based. The periods of inspection are
based upon estimation form previous experience and historical data analyzed at the
time of setting the regulations. For instance, ship’s structures are subject to annual,
intermediate or special surveys. The scope of these surveys covers the deck, hull
plating, watertight penetration, cargo and water ballast capacities and special survey
such as thickness measurements. These surveys are broadly carried out independently
of the level of risk caused by the failure of each individual element, or the quality of
ship operational and managerial policy. Also, the outside of the ship’s bottom has to
be inspected in dry dock twice every 5 years with a maximum period of 36 month
between two consecutive inspections, without giving consideration neither to the
trading zone nor to the quality of paints and hull maintenance systems.
Nevertheless, today’s technological advances offer high quality paints that can
resist for periods greatly exceeding the mandatory 36 months. Further, new
communication and video systems allow making in-water investigation of probable
hull damages, for identifying possible failures mechanism of the immerged parts of
the structure. But ship-owners who adopt these innovative technologies, or implement
efficient operational and managerial safety policy, do not get any benefits from their
investments, in terms of flexibility of inspection period.
Thus, it can be argued that the current prescriptive time-based inspection
regime does not encourage innovation and improvement of the operational and
managerial performances over the “compliance” levels, as the periods of inspections
consider a unique empirical value of failure likelihood, which is not influenced by the
adopted technological or operational systems.
Consequently, the IMO adopted resolution A.744 related to the Enhanced
Survey Program (ESP) for Bulk Carriers and Oil Tanker (IMO, 1993). This resolution
can be considered to be a first step forward to improve the efficiency of ships
structure inspection framework. However, it can not be considered as a risk based
approach because it only consider the condition of the ship for planning the survey
cycle independently of other parameters such as operating practices.
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Therefore, the efforts of IMO to move toward a proactive inspection regime
should include the use of risk based methodologies that allow generating rational and
efficient inspection plan. The progression toward a proactive inspection regime is
illustrated in Figure 21.

Figure 21: Evolution toward proactive Risk-Based Inspection regime

VII.3. Theoretic foundations
The purpose of ship’s Risk Based Inspection can be defined as:
Identifying the potential deterioration mechanisms, and threats to the
navigability of the ship and the integrity of its structure, and assessing the
likelihood and consequences of potential failures.
This definition comes from the proper definition of the term risk, which is
mainly a combination of consequences of failure (CoF) and likelihood of failure
(LoF):

Figure 22: Risk evaluation for ship inspection
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Consequently the Risk Based Inspections consist of analyzing the likelihood
and consequences of a considered failure in order to generate potential failure
mechanisms that will allow establishing effective inspection plan. These analyses can
be as follows:
¾ Likelihood analysis
A Risk Based approaches for managing inspection would offer more flexible
inspection regime. Particularly, the inspection team would not only be required to
record specific damages or failures to comply with certain requirements, but also
would make analysis of specific threats to the hull integrity, identify probable failure
mechanisms and predict failure likelihood.
Like other risk based concepts, the first step of risk based inspections would
consist of collecting and analyzing data concerning the considered system, secondly,
comes the classical HAZID stage, where the different hazards to the ship’s structure
would be identified, for instance, severe corrosion, cracking, pitting, buckling and
stress and fatigue failures.
This stage will be followed by the likelihood analysis, in which the likelihood
ratio for each hazard will be expressed, depending on qualitative and quantitative
appreciations. This last step will allow generating a likelihood matrix that classifies
hazards in terms of their probability. An illustrative example is given in Table 12; the
appreciation differs depending on various factors. The numerical value of the
likelihood ratio should be dynamic, and revised for any change in the related
parameters. In fact, likelihood will obviously increase with time because of the
degradation of time-dependent structure materials.

Table 9: likelihood of various hazards

Failures

Quantitative appreciation

Qualitative appreciation

cracking

0 – 0,70

Low

buckling

0,70 – 0,85

medium

corrosion

0,85 – 1,00

high
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This likelihood analysis will be influenced by various structure related data,
such as design process information (how close to the limits the structure is initially
designed), the age of the ship (time accelerates fatigue, corrosion and other damaging
process), the degree of innovation, the trading zones, the maintenance conditions and
the operating and managerial expertise of the ship operator.
¾ Consequence Analysis
The consequence of failure influence the risks created by each item of the
ship’s sub-system. Consequently, risk based inspection should consider a thorough
consequence analysis to establish the ship’s inspection plan. In the shipping sector,
consequences can be considered in the four following categories:
•

Consequences to human life: fatalities and injuries;

•

Consequences to the environment: oil or noxious substances leakage and
pollution;

•

Consequences to the ship: costs caused by the damage to the ship’s structure;

•

Consequences to the cargo: costs caused by the damage to the ship’s cargo.
Even though the main objectives of the IMO are the safety of the life and

protection of the environment, the “efficient shipping” goal, introduced recently,
emphasizes the importance of the protection of the ship and its cargo. However, these
parameters make the consequence analysis more complex, as it will be difficult to
estimate the repair value of the ship, especially when introducing parameters such as
costs for immobilization or disruption of a trading contract. The complexity of the
consequences analysis is also increased by the fact that structural failures cause a
redistribution of forces. i.e. for instance a small initial cracking may progress and lead
to the failure of considerable portions of the structure because of forces redistribution
(Basu & Lee, 2006).
Despite these difficulties, consequence analysis methodologies are already
employed for the development of reliability-based design standards, and performanceoriented safety criteria, especially after the introduction of GBS methodology. Thus,
similar concepts can be adopted for the development of the consequence analysis
methodology related to the risk based inspection framework.
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Hence, the consequences of the identified hazards would be classified
according to their severity using qualitative and quantitative approaches. The levels
can range from minor, significant, critical to catastrophic consequences. Accordingly,
the ranking of consequences would be realized depending on the previously identified
impact categories (namely, the human life, the environment, the ship and its cargo).

Combination of likelihood and consequences
The combination of the likelihood and consequences analysis, will allow
generating a risk ranking matrix that permits classifying the various structural
elements, components and assemblies according to their criticality. Thus, the
inspection efforts would be more focused on structural elements which represent high
risk levels, and less finite inspection resources would be used for the areas
representing lower concern.
VII.4. Application of the risk based inspection approach
For the purpose of this application, a midsection of a single skinned bulk
carrier will be considered. The survey will consider the internal inspection of top side
and bottom side ballast tanks (respectively the TST and BST), the double bottom
ballast tanks (DBT), the side shell (SID) and the transversal bulkhead (TRB) (see
Figure 24).
The first step will consist of
gathering data, such as the thickness
Side Shell Failure
63%

measurements, maintenance program and
corrosion-prevention methods used inside
the ballast tanks, the initial structural
design, and the type of transported cargo.

Hull failure

Failure of deck
fitting and
ventilators
4,8%

Subsequently, this information will be
combined with statistical data such as the

Hatch cover failure
25,7%

historical distribution of the structural hull
failures area represented in Figure 23
(IMO, 2001b). This step will allow
generating likelihood classification of the

Others
6,5%

Figure 23: distribution of hull failures for bulk
carriers

structural regions concerned.
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In the second step, the failures consequences are estimated for each area, using
the four categories of consequences. An illustrative example is given in table 13,
which reflects only the author’s appreciation of the related failures.
Table 10: Qualitative estimation of hull failures consequences

Area

Human life
Significant
Critical
Critical
Catastrophic
Critical

TST
BST
DBT
SID
TRB

Consequence category
Environment
ship
Minor
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Significant
Critical
Catastrophic
Minor
Significant

cargo
Minor
Significant
Critical
Catastrophic
Catastrophic

This consequence weighting illustration will then be combined with the
likelihood analysis matrix, to draw up a risk ranking table, which allows prioritizing
the high risk area in the inspection plan. The risk ranking matrix will use weighting
coefficients, which can be as follows:

Likelihood

Table 11: example of Risk Ranking Matrix

High
Medium
Low

4
2
0
Minor

5
6
4
5
2
4
Significant
Critical
Consequences

8
6
5
Catastrophic

The most challenging process, will then be illustrating the risk assessment
results in an adequate form that would be used for preparing the inspection plan. In
this process, computer software can be developed in order to generate adequate
inspection plans in function of the input data that will be entered by the surveyor,
depending on the risk appreciation of each vessel.

TST
SID
TRB
BST
DBT

Figure 24: Cross section of a typical single skinned bulk carrier
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VII.5. Benefits of the Risk Based Inspection approach:
The first benefit of adopting a risk based inspection concept, is harmonizing
the approaches to the various aspects of maritime safety. In fact, the IMO already
introduced various proactive risk-based approaches for the rule-making framework
and the ship design and building methodologies. Thus, adopting a risk-based ship
inspection regime will allow matching the last shackle of the of the maritime safety
chain, namely ship surveying activity, with the new safety trend.
Secondly, the risk based inspection regime will provide more flexibility to
ship-owners for planning their inspection periods, and will encourage higher quality
of managerial and operating procedures, as the investment in these aspects would
bring benefits in terms of inspection periodicity. Consequently, the inspections will be
more targeted and the operational constraints better managed, resulting in a more
optimized and cost effective inspection program, while maintaining the same level of
safety (Conachey, Serratella & Wang, 2008).
Thirdly, it would allow extending the duration of ship operation between two
consecutive dry-dockings, since this major maintenance operation will no longer be
exclusively time-based, but rather rely on various factors, as illustrated in Appendix C.
Fourthly, the risk based inspection approach will allow generating inspection
data bases that contain historical data on various ship equipment designs, damage
repairs, inspection findings and failure mechanisms. This data bases will increase both
the ship operators’ and surveyors’ knowledge of the levels of potential risk posed to
every ship element.
Moreover, the risk-based inspection would allow meeting the functional
requirements of the GBS methodology, which aim to monitor the condition of ships to
ensure that they achieve reasonable safety performance criteria during their whole life
cycle.
Finally, it can be argued that risk based inspection would increase maritime
safety, because it allows identifying high risk areas of the ship, and generation
inspection plans tailored for every particular ship type, operator and condition.

79

Chapter VII: Risk-based Ship Inspection Regime

VII.5. Chapter’s Conclusions and Recommendations:
Risk based inspection methodologies have been widely used in sensitive
industries such as nuclear, chemistry and offshore sector over the last decade (ABS,
2004). The analysis of the latest developments in the maritime safety regime, which is
moving toward a proactive risk-based approach, allow predicting that the future step
will be adopting risk based methods to support the traditional prescriptive inspection
regime.
This new inspection regime will improve the targeting and timing of the
inspections, and allow generating flexible and cost effective inspection plans, to
ensure that the condition of ship’s equipment and structure are fit-for-service during
its whole life-cycle, through the assessment and prediction of potential failure
mechanism, which supports the IMO GBS objectives.
Finally it is recommended that:
•

The risk based inspection should be initially introduced as recommendation
for the enhancement of surveys and inspection of ships structures included in
the safety management system, for the maintenance of ship condition.

•

Crew should be trained for the identification and inspection of ship’s regions
which have high risk potential.

•

The crew inspection should allow emphasizing the areas of great
vulnerability, and generating Risk Control Options such as the improvement
of coating or using corrosion-prevention methods, in order to mitigate failure
mechanisms.

•

The risk based inspection can then be generalized for the structural
inspections of ships for classification and statutory purposes. The
development of computer software and more sophisticated inspection
equipment would be indispensable for the effective implementation of this
last step.
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Chapter VIII: General Conclusions
VIII.1. Review of the Objectives
One of major IMO objectives for the 21st century is developing a proactive
safety regime that would improve the perceived picture of the whole shipping industry.
Accordingly, various initiatives were adopted and experimented to ensure that hazards
are identified as early as possible and are eliminated or mitigated cost effectively.
These initiatives make that IMO regulations are no more “post-disasters” reactions,
but also preventive measures against all foreseeable accidents.
The aim of this dissertation was to make an explanatory and exploratory study
of the different approaches to proactive maritime safety and to investigate the
contribution of risk science in these approaches.
In other words, the scientific objective was to prove the incentive for
employing risk management techniques for the proactive maritime safety regulations,
and to contribute to the demonstration of the adaptability risk-based methodologies to
the context of maritime safety regulation, and the practical objective was to provide
an analytical support and to develop a basis of fundamental knowledge, methods and
techniques using risk-based principles for building a proactive maritime safety regime.
Thus, in the first part, the origins and the importance of the maritime safety
regulation have been recalled. It was mainly concluded that even if the traditional
configuration of maritime safety regulations (deterministic and prescriptive) is still a
major source of maritime safety knowledge, certain limits such as the fragmentation,
the over-regulation, the perceived incentive for unilateral or regional initiatives and
the limited innovation capability, justify the necessity for a “wind of change” within
the IMO rule-making process.
This requirement was also highlighted by reviewing the regulatory approaches
of other sensitive industries such as the nuclear and offshore sectors, which
emphasized the contribution of risk science in the evolution of their safety framework.
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Then the study allowed making a critical review of the methods developed to
meet the proactive maritime safety objectives and their relation with risk management
principles. For instance, the FSA framework pre-use risk analysis concept before the
development of regulations to facilitate the decision-making process, while the
alternative design and arrangements and Goal-based Standards approaches post-use
risk assessment principles for setting, evaluating and approving the compliance with
related safety criteria. Hence, it can be concluded that risk-based methodologies are
used to respond to the need for a proactive safety regime at multiple levels.
Subsequently, the difficulties faced by the proactive maritime safety initiatives
were illustrated, for instance the new approach implies that the design of the ship
becomes based on the quantification of hazards and analysis of historical and
statistical data from casualty analysis, which are used for modeling the safety
standards required for the intended ship’s life cycle. However, until now, it is not
unusual that the required data is still inaccurate mainly because of the absence of
unified taxonomy and accidental database. Thus, the whole process will generate
uncertainties, which need to be managed in order to avoid misleading results.
Fortunately, the harmonization of casualty analysis methodologies and data taxonomy
is being considered by the IMO, especially after the adoption of the mandatory Code
of Casualty Investigation.
Moreover, the proactive ship design building framework pose a dilemma with
regard to ensuring and monitoring that GBS-built ships comply with adequate safety
criteria at the stages of design, building and during their whole life cycle. Thus, the
proposed solution was the development of a Risk-Based safety regime, inspired from
the nuclear and offshore inspection approaches. Accordingly, a first tentative to
develop such regime was presented, and some difficulties associated with this regime
were then identified.
Finally, it can be argued that this proactive trend, not only allows achieving
the IMO safety enhancement objectives, but it also promotes giving to ship designers
great concept flexibility that encourages innovation, and provides to ship owners more
cost effective alternatives for matching their commercial goals with effective safety
objectives. All these arguments pave the way toward a more effective integrated
shipping industry.
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VIII.2. Limitations of the research
After reviewing the importance of realized work, it is now essential to present
the practical difficulties and to clarify the limits of the reviewed methodologies.
First, though the introduction of the risk principles would enable the
development of a more balanced and flexible legislation, for the design of vessels and
other equipment and arrangements, it was noted certain reluctance for their
application. The first reluctance is due to the fact that the risk assessment requires
structured and costly efforts in the phase of hazards identification, then the second
reluctance is related to the fact that the experts’ judgment of the qualitative risk
analysis can be biased, which would greatly influence the study results. Fortunately,
uncertainties and reluctance are diminishing and confidence is increasing due to the
progressive generalization of the application of risk-based techniques at the stages of
rule making and ship design.
Second, the enhancement of application of risk-based techniques within
maritime safety obviously requires an intensive learning stage. In fact, the use of risk
based-methods can enlarge the technological and knowledge gap between highperformance Flag States and classification societies from one side, and more modest
maritime administration from the other side. Thus, intensive learning and knowledge
acquisition is indispensible for these maritime administrations to catch the expertise
and scientific advances reached by other parties and avoid a full delegation of their
responsibilities to recognized organization. This aspect was not thoroughly covered
by the scope of the present study.
The limitation of this study is also related to the incorporation of the human
element for developing safety regulations and setting the safety criteria. Also, the
benefits provided by the introduction of the ISM Code in the maritime sector for
building a proactive safety culture were not comprehensively explored. Unfortunately,
it was not possible to carefully explore these major safety aspects, given the
importance of a detailed study exclusively dedicated to these subjects.
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Finally, given the reduced level of maturity of research for the new
performance and goal based standards in the maritime sector, and the scarcity of the
published studies on the subject, it was decided that a comparative analysis between
the application of the goal based and prescriptive standards on board specific ships
would not provide reliable results. Thus, the research was limited to contrasting the
theories and objectives of the traditional and new regime, and emphasizing the
benefits and limitations of these two safety approaches.

VIII.3. Recommendations for further studies
After reviewing the main contributions of the present research and examining
its limits, it became possible to draw up prospects for future work.
First, risk-based methodologies are used for developing regulations and
promoting safer and cost effective design for ships covered by IMO instruments.
Further developments of these methodologies would give great incentive to maritime
administrations and ship owners to employ these approaches, on voluntary basis, for
the national rule-making and the design of non-convention vessels. A comprehensive
study of the applicability of these risk-based safety regimes in a national context, and
for vessels that are not subject to the application of mandatory IMO instruments
would provide effective solutions to the safety problems posed by this type of ships.
Second risk based methodologies are distinctly applied at multiple levels of
the global maritime safety framework, such as rule making, design of safety
equipment and arrangements, ship building and evaluation of safety criteria.
Additional in depth studies could determine the feasibility of the harmonization and
integration of all these risk-based applications for the development of an integrated
maritime safety framework.
Third, clear and definite risk-based safety criteria setting and monitoring
framework, and risk perception and acceptability levels identification (such
transparent methods for setting the ALARP levels) should be deeply investigated, as
well as their effect on the current safety regime.
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Fourth, the use of performance and goal based standards should be completed
by the development universal databases of ship building and safety criteria
identification. These data bases would be completed by the maintenance and
inspection records of these ships after the introduction of the predicted risk-based
maintenance and inspection regimes.
Moreover, the introduction of goal based standards and performance based
codes is still posing a dilemma with regard to the criteria of their inspection under
Port State Control (PSC) activity. The author’s opinion is that these risk-based
designed ships should be inspected under a risk-based Port State Control regime.
Thus, PSC inspection framework should be developed to meet the new safety trend by
adopting a proactive risk based safety approach.
Finally, it was presented that Risk Based Inspection has successfully been
employed in various sensitive industries. In the opinion of the author, these techniques
can be further developed to be introduced in the maritime sector for the inspection of
ship structures in a first stage, and then for the survey of various ship safety
equipment.
The use of these risk-based techniques would also enable engineers to develop
inspection software, which would make the inspection activity more efficient and less
time consuming, especially when considering the increasingly bigger ship
dimensions and the introduction of large double hulled tankers and double skinned
bulk carriers.
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Overview of Main Risk Analysis Methods
Risk Analysis
Methods
Preliminary
hazard analysis
(PrHA)

Preliminary risk
analysis (PRA)

What-if/checklist
analysis

Failure Modes
and Effects
Analyses
(FMEA)

Principles of the method

Common Utilization

The PHA technique is a broad, initial
study that focuses on (1) identifying
apparent hazards, (2) assessing the
severity of potential mishaps that could
occur involving the hazards, and (3)
identifying means (safeguard) for
reducing the risks associated with the
hazards.
This technique focuses on identifying
weaknesses early in the life of a system,
thus saving time and money which might
be required for major redesign if the
hazards are discovered at a later date.
PRA is a streamlined mishap-based risk
assessment approach. The primary
objective of the technique is to
characterize the risk associated with
significant loss scenarios. This teambased approach relies on subject matter
experts systematically examining the
issues. The team postulates combinations
of mishaps, most significant contributors
to losses and safeguards. The analysis
also characterizes the risk of the mishaps
and identifies recommendations for
reducing risk.
What-if analysis is a brainstorming
approach that uses loosely structured
questioning to
(1) postulate potential upsets that may
result in mishaps or system performance
problems and (2) ensure that appropriate
safeguards against those problems are in
place.
Checklist analysis is a systematic
evaluation against pre-established criteria
in the form of one or more checklists.
FMEA is an inductive reasoning approach
that is best suited to reviews of mechanical
and electrical hardware systems. The
FMEA technique (1) considers how the
failure modes of each system component
can result in system performance problems
and (2) ensures that appropriate safeguards
against such problems are in place. A
quantitative version of FMEA is known as
failure modes, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA).

•

Most often conducted early in the
development of an activity or
system where there is little detailed
information or operating
procedures, and is often a precursor
to further hazard/risk analyses.
• Primarily used for hazard
identification and ranking in any
type system/process.

•

Primarily used for generating risk
profiles across a broad range of
activities (e.g., a port-wide risk
assessment).

•

Generally applicable to any type
of system, process or activity
(especially when pertinent
checklists of loss prevention
requirements or best practices
exist).
• Most often used when the use of
other more systematic methods
(e.g., FMEA and HAZOP analysis)
is not practical.

•

Primarily used for reviews of
mechanical and electrical systems
(e.g., fire suppression systems,
vessel steering / propulsion
systems).
• Often used to develop and
optimize planned maintenance and
equipment inspection plans.
• Sometimes used to gather
information for troubleshooting
systems.
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Overview of Main Risk Analysis Methods (Continued)
Risk Analysis
Methods
HAZard and
Operability
(HAZOP)
analysis

Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA)

Principles of the method

Common Utilization

The HAZOP analysis technique is an
inductive approach that uses a
systematic process (using special guide
words) for (1) postulating deviations
from design intents for sections of
systems and (2) ensuring that
appropriate safeguards are in place to
help prevent system performance
problems.
FTA is a deductive analysis technique
that graphically models (using Boolean
logic) how logical relationships
between equipment failures, human
errors and external events can combine
to cause specific mishaps of interest.

•

Event Tree
Analysis (ETA)

ETA is an inductive analysis technique
that graphically models (using decision
trees) the possible outcomes of an
initiating event capable of producing a
mishap of interest.

Relative
Ranking/Risk
Indexing

Relative ranking/risk indexing uses
attributes of a vessel, shore facility,
port or waterway to calculate index
numbers that are useful for making
relative comparisons of various
alternatives (and in some cases can be
correlated to actual performance
estimates).
CRA uses operations/evaluations and
associated functions for accomplishing
those operations/evolutions to describe
the activities of a type of vessel or
shore facility. Then, possible deviations
in carrying out functions are postulated
and evaluated to characterize the risk of
possible mishaps, to generate risk
profiles in a number of formats and to
recommend appropriate risk mitigation
actions.

Coarse Risk
Analysis (CRA)

Primarily used for identifying
safety hazards and operability
problems of continuous process
systems (especially fluid and thermal
systems). Also used to review
procedures and other sequential
operations.

•

Generally applicable for almost
every type of analysis application, but
most effectively used to address the
fundamental causes of specific system
failures dominated by relatively
complex combinations of events.
• Often used for complex electronic,
control or communication systems.
• Generally applicable for almost
every type of analysis application, but
most effectively used to address
possible outcomes of initiating events
for which multiple safeguards (lines
of assurance) are in place as
protective features.
• Often used for analysis of vessel
movement mishaps and propagation
of fire/explosions or toxic releases.
• Extensively used to establish
priorities for boarding and inspecting
foreign flagged vessels.
• Generally applicable to any type of
analysis situation (especially when
only relative priorities are needed) as
long as a pertinent scoring tool exists.
•

Primarily used to analyze (in some
detail) the broad range of
operations/evolutions associated with
a specific class of vessel or type of
shore facility.
• Analyses can be performed for a
representative vessel/facility within a
class or may be applied to specific
vessels/facilities.
• Especially useful when risk-based
information is sought to optimize
field inspections for classes of
vessels/facilities.
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Overview of Main Risk Analysis Methods (Continued)
Risk Analysis
Methods
Pareto analysis

Root cause
analysis
• Event charting
• 5 Whys
technique
• Root Cause
Map

Principles of the method

Common Utilization

Pareto analysis is a prioritization
technique based solely on historical
data that identifies the most significant
items among many. This technique
employs the 80-20 rule, which states
that ~80 percent of the problems
(effects) are produced by ~20 percent
of the causes.
Root cause analysis uses one or a
combination of analysis tools to
systematically dissect how a mishap
occurred (i.e., identifying specific
equipment failures, human errors and
external events contributing to the
loss). Then, the analysis continues to
discover the underlying root causes of
the key contributors to the mishap and
to make recommendations for
correcting the root causes.

•

Change analysis

Change analysis systematically looks
for possible risk impacts and
appropriate risk management strategies
in situations in which change is
occurring (e.g., when system
configurations are altered, when
operating practices/policies changes,
when new/different activities will be
performed).

Common Cause
Failure Analysis
(CCFA)

CCFA is a specialized approach for
systematically examining sequences of
events stemming from the conduct of
activities and/or operation of physical
systems that cause multiple
failures/errors to occur from the same
root causes, thus defeating multiple
layers of protection simultaneously.

Generally applicable to any type of
system, process or activity (as long as
ample historical data is available).
• Most often used to broadly
characterize the most important risk
contributors for more detailed
analysis.
•

Generally applicable to the
investigation of any mishap or some
identified deficiency in the field.
• Event charting is most commonly
used when the loss scenario is
relatively complicated, involving a
significant chain of events and/or a
number of underlying root causes.
• 5 Whys is most commonly used for
more straightforward loss scenarios.
• Root Cause Map is used in
conjunction with any root cause
analysis to challenge analysts to
consider a range of possible root
causes.
• Generally applicable to any
situation in which change from
normal configuration/operations/
activities is likely to significantly
affect risks (e.g., marine events in
ports/waterways).
• Can be used as an effective root
cause analysis method as well as a
predictive hazard/risk analysis
method
• Exclusively used as a supplement
to a broader analysis using another
technique, especially fault tree and
event tree analyses.
• Best suited for situations in which
complex combinations of
errors/equipment failures are
necessary for undesirable events to
occur.
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Overview of Main Risk Analysis Methods (Continued)
Risk Analysis
Methods
Human error
analysis
• Error-likely
situation
analysis
• Walkthrough
analysis
• Guide word
analysis
• Human
reliability
analysis
•

Principles of the method

Common Utilization

Human error analysis involves a range
of analysis methods from simple
human factors checklist through more
systematic (step-by-step) analyses of
human actions to more sophisticated
human reliability analyses. These tools
focus on identifying and correcting
error-likely situations that set people up
to make mistakes that lead to mishaps.

•

Generally applicable to any type of
activity that is significantly dependent
on human performance.
• Error-likely situation analysis is the
simplest approach and is used as a
basic level of analysis for human
factors issues.
• Walkthrough and guide word
analyses are used for more systematic
analyses of individual procedures.
• Human reliability analysis is used
for special applications in which
detailed quantification of human
reliability performance is needed.

Source: American Bureau of Shipping. (2000). Guidance Notes on Risk Assessment
Applications for the Marine and Offshore Oil and Gas Industries. New York:
Author
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Figure 25: IMO Flowchart of the FSA methodology
International Maritime Organization. (2007, May 14). Formal Safety assessment Consolidated text of the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in
the IMO rule-making process (MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392). (MSC 83/INF.2).
London: Author.
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Figure 26: Comparison between RISK-based and RULE-based hull
inspections.
Source: Lee, A.K., Serratella, C., Wang, G. & Basu, R. (2006). Flexible
Approaches to Risk-Based Inspection of FPSOs. Houston: Offshore Technology
Conference. Retrieved May 7, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.otcnet.org/2006/tech prog/sched/documents/otc183641.pdf
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Figure 27: Main Steps in the development of an RBI Program
American Bureau of Shipping. (2003). Guide for Surveys Using Risk-Based
Inspection for the Offshore Industry. New York: Author
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Table 12: Pros and Cons of Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis
Techniques

Qualitative Analysis
Pros

Cons

Quantitative Analysis
Pros

Cons

Captures expertise
of persons most
familiar with
facility.

Need time
commitment from
qualified persons.

Can generate
results based on
existing data.

Need to determine
which models to
use and how they
will be integrated
with each other.

Can quickly screen
out equipment or
structures with no
damage
mechanisms or with
low consequence of
failure.

May fail to
consider all failure
mechanisms in all
modes of operation,
especially
combination of
failures.

Requires less time
on part of experts
during the
analysis.

Expensive to build
and maintain, may
require software
support.

Can be less costly
than quantitative
analysis.

Results may be
difficult to defend
to third party

Becomes less
costly with
experience in use
of models.

May be high cost
on initial studies.

Can be faster than
quantitative study.

Inconsistent results,
care must be taken
to provide audit
trail.

Consistent results,
auditable,
perception of
accuracy.

Accuracy depends
on data availability
and accuracy.

American Bureau of Shipping. (2003). Guide for Surveys Using Risk-Based
Inspection for the Offshore Industry. New York: Author
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